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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit-Recognition of
Foreign Divorce Decrees
A deserted her husband, B deserted his wife, and, proceeding to-
gether to Nevada, they established the required six-weeks residence and
obtained divorces, A's husband being served by publication only and
B's wife by publication and also by personal service in North Carolina.
As soon as these decrees became final, A and B were married and re-
turned to North Carolina where they were prosecuted for bigamous
cohabitation. The Supreme Court upheld their conviction,' refusing to
'State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17 S. E. (2d) 769 (1942). The man's
sentence was for not less than three nor more than ten years at hard labor. The
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recognize the validity of the Nevada divorces. The basis of the opinion
was that since the Haddock case left the states free to decide as a matter
of comity whether or not to recognize foreign divorce decrees when
only constructive service on defendant was had, North Carolina has
chosen to ignore them.2
Simply because this decision is consistent with the view expressed in
North Carolina cases whenever a question of the recognition of the
divorce decrees of sister states has arisen, it is of vital significance to
numerous families in the state whose existence is predicated upon such
anemic divorces as the one in the principal case. If a discussion of the
law relating to the extraterritorial validity of divorces can contain little
material which has not been more or less exhaustively treated both in
this and other publications, nevertheless it may serve to warn the bar
and public and to stress a point on which it would be difficult to place
too much emphasis.
The generally accepted theory of jurisdiction for divorce3 is that
the marital status is a res located where the parties to the status are
domiciled, since the state of domicile is deemed to have most interest
therein. The divorce proceeding is an action in rem directed against
that res. Domicile of at least one of the parties is therefore essential
for jurisdiction, and where a divorce is granted by a state in which
neither party is domiciled, the decree is invalid both in that state and
elsewhere, although both parties may have appeared in the action. A
state in which both parties are domiciled has jurisdiction to grant a
divorce valid locally and also in other states under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.
As long as a wife was unable to establish a domicile separate from
that of her husband the possibilities were limited to these two situations,
but when she was allowed to have a domicile of her own, the courts
were confronted with the problem of the validity and recognition by
other states of divorces granted at the domicile of one spouse against a
spouse domiciled elsewhere. The great majority of states have con-
sidered the marital res as divisible, enough of it remaining with each
spouse to allow that spouse to obtain a divorce at his or her domicile,
on actual or constructive notice, which would be valid where granted
and entitled to recognition elsewhere. A minority composed of New
York, North Carolina, South Carolina and Pennsylvania have felt that
woman received a sentence of not less than three nor more than five years at
such labor as is provided for women prisoners by law.
2 State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 460, 17 S. E. (2d) 769, 778 (1942).
'Note (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 193; Note (1940) 18 CHI-KENT L. REv. 178;
STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 267-284; GOODRICH, HAND-
BOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1938) §§123-128; Leflar, More Faith and Credit
for Divorce Decrees (1939) 4 Mo. L. Rzv. 268.
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the action partook enough of the character of an in personam action
to require personal service in the decree-granting state or appearance
by the defendant in the action as a requisite to recognition. Another
group of states holds that the domicile of plaintiff plus actual notice to
defendant is all that is necessary.
In 1906, the United States Supreme Court decided 4 that a divorce
granted at the domicile of only one spouse must be given Full Faith
and Credit by other states (1) when the decree-granting state is also
the last matrimonial domicile although service is given by publication
only and (2) when the decree-granting state is not the last matrimonial
domicile but (a) the defendant was personally served or (b) appeared
in the action. The court also decided that although the states were not
compelled to recognize decrees rendered on constructive service alone
except at the last matrimonial domicile, nevertheless if they complied
with the law of the state granting them, such decrees were valid locally
and might be given recognition by another state as a matter of comity.
Thus North Carolina was left at liberty to refuse validity to such decrees
and, as in the principal case, has consistently held them void.5
The proposition that divorces in other states on constructive service
are good where rendered but invalid in North Carolina is settled law.
There necessarily arises from it, however, the absurd spectacle of the
wife without a husband and the husband without a wife: a man divorced
in Nevada, with perhaps a second wife there, never having been di-
vorced in North Carolina from his first wife who has been discarded
but who is, nonetheless, bound to him by undisturbed marriage ties.
The majority view, which goes on the assumption that divorcing a man
from his wife necessarily divorces her from him, has, at least, the virtue
of simplicity.
New York shares with North Carolina the doctrine that, so far as
her own citizens are concerned, divorces granted against them on con-
structive service by other states are invalid in New York.0 It was the
decision of a case in New York involving a Connecticut decree against
a New York resident upon service by publication which gave rise to
the pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Haddock v.
Haddock.7 That New York in holding such divorces void is primarily
interested in the protection of the interests of her own citizens is indi-
cated by decisions upholding ex parte divorces where the parties were
citizens of other states.8
'Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. ed. 867 (1906).
' Wettach, Nrorth Carolina and Jurisdiction for Divorce (1922) 1 N. C. L. REV.
95; Note (1930) 16 VA. L. REv. 706; Note (1929) 17 GEo. L. J. 264.
'Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State(1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 373.
" See note 4 supra. 8 Note (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 372.
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Two New York cases tend to throw doubt upon the orthodox theory
that domicile of at least one of the parties is essential for jurisdiction.9
Gould v. Gould'0 was an action for divorce in which the husband set
up as an affirmative defense a French divorce granted him some ten
years before. The husband was domiciled in New York at the time but
resident in France. The wife, also domiciled in New York, had ap-
peared in the action and had contested it. The New York court held
that although the French decree was not entered at the domicile of
either party it was entitled to recognition.
In Glaser v. Glaser" a Nevada divorce was held valid as a defense
to a wife's action for separation. Although she showed clearly that the
husband had not acquired a bona fide domicile in Nevada, nevertheless
her general appearance in the action was held to preclude a reexamina-
tion of the question of domicile by the New York court.
The Glaser case goes even further than the Supreme Court of the
United States in Davis v. Davis.'2 In that case it was held that a
Virginia divorce decree granted on the petition of the husband must be
given Full Faith and Credit in the District of Columbia when the wife,
a resident of the District, had appeared in the Virginia court and there
litigated the jurisdictional question of whether her husband was domi-
ciled in Virginia. The decision of that issue in the husband's favor was
res judicata everywhere, and the District Court could not constitution-
ally reexamine the question of whether the husband was domiciled in
Virginia. It has formerly been thought that a general appearance was
necessary for Full Faith and Credit, but it has been suggested that a
special appearance supplemented by certain other conduct by the de-
fendant is now enough.13
Professor Beale is at least one commentator who urges that the
holding in Haddock v. Haddock was a statement of jurisdiction as well
as of the limits of Full Faith and Credit.14 Although this view has
not been accepted, Beale's influence was enough to cause its incorpora-
tion into the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS which also suggested
that the Supreme Court add two further circumstances under which
Full Faith and Credit should be compelled for foreign divorces.15 These
'Howe, The Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York State(1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 373.
0 235 N. Y. 14, 138 N. E. 490 (1923).
" 276 N. Y. 296, 12 N. E. (2d) 305 (1938) ; Note (1938) 7 FORDHAM L. REV.
258.
12 305 U. S. 32, 59 S. Ct. 3, 83 L. ed. 26 (1938) ; Leflar, More Faith and Creditfor Divorce Decrees (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 268.3 Note (1939) 8 FORDHAm L. REv. 80.
"* Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce (1906) 19 HARV. L.
REV. 586; Beale, Haddock Revisited (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 417.
15 RESTATEMENT, CONFLcr OF LAWS (1934) §113; Strahorn, A Rationale of
the Haddock Case (1938) 32 I.L. L. REv. 796; Strahorn, The Supreme Court
19421
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are (1) where one spouse has consented to the other's separate domicile
and (2) where one party has by his misconduct forfeited the right to
object to such separate domicile. Although the purpose of these re-
quirements is greater uniformity of recognition, they have been severely
criticized' 6 on the ground that by injecting into the cases a further juris-
dictional fact, i.e., fault, they will tend to have the opposite result. The
Supreme Court has remained uninfluenced by them. 17
The courts have been constrained to mitigate to some extent the
harshness resulting from the invalidity of foreign divorces by limiting
the class of those who are able to attack them. On principles of estoppel
or quasi-estoppel it has been declared (1) that one who has obtained
an invalid decree cannot subsequently question its validity and (2) that
one who relies upon an invalid decree by remarrying will not be allowed
to claim later that it is not good.' 8 This does not mean that the decrees
are valid, for the person who remarries is subject to a prosecution for
bigamy and the children of the second marriage are in danger of being
declared illegitimate. As against the state or the children and the other
spouse by the first marriage there is no estoppel. Virginia sometimes
applies the doctrine of laches to prevent attack upon void decrees.' 9 In
Dry v. Rice,2° a "Reno divorce" obtained by the wife where a finding
of no bona fide domicile was warranted, was protected from attack by
the husband who, with knowledge of the divorce, delayed questioning it
for two and a half years until the wife had remarried.
The court in the principal case2 ' suggests by way of dictum that the
divorces in question are vulnerable because they are typical "Reno
divorces." In the typical "Reno divorce" the bona fide domicile of the
plaintiff is doubtful even though a residence requirement may have been
complied with. The finding of domicile, a jurisdictional fact, by the
court of the forum is not conclusive upon other courts, and if another
court finds lack of domicile the divorce is void under the rule that a
state in which neither party to a marriage is domiciled has no juris-
diction to grant a divorce.2 2 Domicile has been defined as presence with
intent to remain. 23 The defendants in the instant case clearly did not
Revisits Haddock (1939) 33 ILL. L. REv. 412; Bingham, The American Law
Institute vs. the Supreme Court (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 393.
"' Leflar, More Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV.
268.
"Note (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 488.
aRESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) §112; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 280-284; GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1938) 350; Notes (1940) 18 N. Y. U. L. Q. 94, (1940) 9 FORDEAm L. REV.
242.
" Note (1935) 22 VA. L. REV. 233. 20147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473 (1927).
2 State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 460, 462, 17 S. E. (2d) 769, 778, 780
(1942).
"2RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) §111.
"Note (1935) 22 VA. L. REV. 233.
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establish domicile in Nevada under this definition. They were phys-
ically present in Nevada for six weeks, it is true, but their going to
Nevada together, their prompt filing of suit, and their marriage and
immediate return to North Carolina after the decree are persuasive
that they lack animus manendi, and that they left North Carolina for
the purpose of evading its laws and practiced a fraud upon the courts
of another state in order to do so. Generally, however, the Nevada
courts are not deceived. Thus, they might be regarded as participating
in the "fraud."
In a dispute over the estate of a North Carolina professor, the Vir-
ginia court recently denied validity to a divorce which had been obtained
in Arkansas, on the ground that the professor had not extablished a
bona fide domicile there.2 4 He had gone to Arkansas, ostensibly for a
vacation, and had resumed his professorial duties in North Carolina
before the final decree was entered. Incidentally, the attitude of the
Virginia court toward "Reno divorces" is interesting both as illustra-
tive of a possible trend in the direction of more frequent recognition in
proper cases and also as showing the technique of evasion which courts
are forced to use to prevent undeserved hardship which would some-
times follow a strict adherence to accepted notions of the validity of
foreign divorces. 25 The burden of proving lack of domicile is with the
attacker, and, in determining whether this burden has been sustained,
the court exercises a wide discretion, manipulating presumptions and
evidential requirements almost at will. Consequently, in cases where the
equities so dictate, the burden becomes well-nigh impossible to over-
come. But where the situation of the parties justifies denying recogni-
tion to the decree almost any evidence of lack of domicile will be used
to sustain the burden of the attacker.26
The possible consequences of these divorce decrees obtained without
bona fide domicile, and, in North Carolina, of those obtained on con-
structive service, are so far-reaching that they will no doubt startle the
average individual. Their validity "is open to question in suits for
divorce, annulment, alimony or separate maintenance, custody of chil-
dren, criminal proceedings for fornication, adultery, bigamy, or non-
support, proceedings in probate for letters of administration, actions to
participate in an estate as a lawful heir, petitions for dower or the
equivalent thereof, actions for alienation of affection, suits for breach
of promise to marry, and actions for ejectment, or specific perform-
ance .21
27
The natural question for one who has obtained such a divorce to
24 Howe v. Howe, 18 S. E. (2d) 294 (1942).
2 Note (1935) 22 VA. L. REv. 233. " Note (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 797.
17 Note (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 567.
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ask, especially if he has married again on the strength of it, is, "What
measures can I take to remedy the situation ?" The sad truth probably
is that he can do nothing to help himself. He cannot get another divorce
in the original decree-granting state, for the matter would be res fudi-
cata there. The doctrine of estoppel would prevent a second divorce in
any other state. For an essential allegation of the complaint in a divorce
action is the existence of a marriage, and this necessarily involves a
denial of the validity of the original divorce. But the one who procures
a divorce is estopped to deny its validity.28
ARTHUR C. JPNES, JR.
Criminal Law-Barratry
In State v. Batson' the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld
conviction of defendant, a layman, for an attempt to commit the crime
of common barratry. The court found that he, unsolicited, had ap-
proached others and urged each of them to institute suits, upon ap-
parently reasonable grounds, offering to assist such persons in the
conduct of this litigation, and agreeing to receive his compensation from
their recoveries. The decision was based upon the fact that as common
barratry was an offense at common law, under C.S.§9702 the crime is
now recognized in this state.
Common barratry is "the offense of frequently exciting and stirring
up suits and quarrels either at law or otherwise. ' 3 This was a mis-
2S Other treatments in North Carolina publications of aspects of the general
subject of foreign divorces are: Migratory Divorce (1935) 2 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 289; Wettach, North Carolina and Jurisdiction for Divorce (1922) 1 N. C.
L. REV. 95; Frierson, Divorce in South Carolina (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 265;
Jacobs, Attack on Decrees of Divorce by Second Spouses (1936) 15 N. C. L. REV.
136; Note (1933) 1 DUKE B. A. J. 77.
'220 N. C. 411, 17 S. E. (2d) 511 (1941).
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §970. "All such parts of the common law as
were heretofore in force and use within this state, or so much of the common law
as is not destructive of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and
independence of this state and the form of government therein established, and
which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated,
repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this
state."
24 BL. Comm. *134; See Scott v. State, 53 Ga. App. 61, 185 S. E. 131 (1936)
The Case of Barretry, 8 Co. 36b, 77 Eng. Rep. 528; Co. LIr. 368; HAWK., P. C.
(1788) c. 81, §1; 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES (9th ed. 1877) *266; 1 BOUVIER, LAw Dic-
TIONARY (3rd rev. ed. 1914) 327; BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 196;
Brooks, Champerty and Maintenance in The United States (1916) 3 VA. L. REV.
421.
Barratry is also an offense of an entirely different sort in the field of maritime
law, but this phase is not to be discussed here. See Waters v. The Merchants'
Louisville Insurance Co., 11 Pet. 213, 9 L. ed. 691 (1837) and note, 9 L. ed. at 692;
New Orleans Insurance Co. v. Albro Co., 112 U. S. 506, 5 S. Ct. 289, 28 L. ed. 809
(1884) and note 28 L. ed. at 809; 1 BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd rev. ed. 1914)
327: BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 196.
At the outset, "barratry," "champerty" and "maintenance" should be distin-
guished. These three offenses are closely intermingled and akin one to the other.
[Vol. 20
NOTES AND COMMENTS
demeanor at common law, 4 punishable by fine and imprisonment 5 plus
disbarment for attorneys.6 Numerous states have adopted statutes
modifying the common law, 7 and at least one of these has been upheld
"Maintenance' is an officious intermeddling in suits in which the offender has no
interest by assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend
the action against the other. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 1144; 2
THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) 655; Note (1919) 3 MINN. L. REV. 520,
522; Winfield, History of Maintenance and Champerty (1935) 35 L. Q. REv. 50.
"Champerty" is a bargain made by a stranger to the litigation with one of the
parties, whereby the stranger undertakes to carry on the suit at his own risk and
cost, and by which he receives part of the subject matter of the litigation as com-
pensation. "Champerty differs from maintenance chiefly in this, that in champerty
the compensation to be given for the service rendered is a part of the matter in
suit, or some profit growing out of it ... while in simple maintenance the question
of compensation does not enter into the account.... In maintenance the interfering
party is in no way benefited by the success of the party aided, but simply inter-
meddles officiously. Thus, every champerty includes maintenance, but not every
maintenance is champerty." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1933) 306. See
Smith v. Hartsell, 150 N. C. 71, 63 S. E. 172 (1908) ; 2 THORNTON, op. cit. supra
at 653; Brooks, loc. cit. supra; Notes (1897) 11 HARv. L. REV. 192, (1904) 18
HARV. L. REv. 222, (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 520. "Barratry is the frequent stirring
up of suits and quarrels, While only one such act would be maintenance." Win-
field, loc. cit. supra; Note (1919) 3 MINN. L. REv. 520.
It is doubtful whether champerty and maintenance were offenses at common law
or whether they were created by early statutes. Many states, including North
Carolina, hold to the former view and conclude that being part of the common law
they are still misdemeanors in the absence of statute. Munday v. Whissenhunt, 90
N. C. 458 (1884); Barnes v. Strong, 54 N. C. 100 (1853) ; Martin v. Clarke, 8
R. I. 389 (1866); 4 BL. Comm. *134; Brooks, loc. cit. supra. See Thompson v.
Reynolds, 73 Ill. 11 (1874). Other states reason either that these offenses were
created by early statutes and were not adopted as part of the common law of the
state, or that the offenses are inconsistent with the present form of government, and
thus deny any criminal liability of the champetor or maintenor. Mathewson v.
Fitch, 22 Cal. 86 (1863) ; Duke v. Harper, 2 Mo. App. 1 (1876) ; Sedgvick v.
Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289 (1856); Fowler v. Callon, 102 N. Y. 395 (1886); Schomp
v. Schenck, 40 N. J. L. 195 (1876).
Courts refuse to enforce barratous and champertous contracts, without regard to
the number of acts. Brush v. Carbondale, 229 Ill. 144, 82 N. E. 252 (1907). See
Munday v. Whissenhunt, 90 N. C. 458 (1884); Notes (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1365,
86 A. L. R. 517; Note 13 infra.
'Lucas v. Pico, 55 Cal. 126 (1880); Burton's Case, Cro. Eliz. 148, 78 Eng.
Rep. 405; Chapman's Case, Cro. Car. 340, 79 Eng. Rep. 898; WINFIELD, HISTORY
OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921) 200, 205; 9 HALSBURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND (1909) 499; ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND
PRACTICE (30th ed. 1938) 1231; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) 607;
HAWK, P. C. (1788) c. 81, §10; Note (1909) 69 CENT. L. J. 117. But see Bentinck
v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458, 472 (1873).
'4 BL. COMM. *134; 2 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1877) 1857; 1
RUSSELL, CRIMES (9th ed. 1877) *266; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §14.
'Alwin's Case, Style, 483, 82 Eng. Rep. 881; 4 BL. Comm. *134; 2 ARCHBOLD,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (8th ed. 1877) 1857; 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES (9th ed. 1877) *266 ;
HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §14. Formerly, in England, an attorney who practiced
before the court after having been convicted of barratry, could be summarily sen-
tenced to seven years penal servitude. 9 HALSRURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1909)
499; ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE (30th ed. 1938)
1231 ; 1 RUSSELL, loc. cit., supra.
'ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) §43-3301; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937) §158;
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935) §181; GA. CODE (1933) §9-9901 et seq., §26-4701; IDAHO
CODE (1932) §17-1012 et seq.; ILL. STAT. (Smith-Hurd) ch. 38, §65; BURNS' IND.
STAT. (1933) §10-3108; KAN., GEN. STAT. (1935) §21-745: FLACK'S ANN. CODE
MD. (1939) Art. 27, §14 et seq.; MASON'S MINN. STAT. (1927) §§9979, 10040;
1942]
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as constitutional by the United States Supreme Court.8 Under the
common law rule, now recognized as in force in this state, the offense
consists of the practice, by lawyer or layman,9 of stirring up civil or
criminal'0 litigation between others, whether on just (which seems to
be the situation in the principal case) or unjust grounds,1 when the
object of promoting such suits is for oppressive or selfish purposes, or
for pecuniary gain to the barrator.' 2  Of course, if the sole object of
promoting such litigations is the attainment of public justice or private
right, it is not barratry' 3-the motive of the alleged barrator in bringing
the suits being the controlling factor. There is some authority for the
position that it is barratous for one to institute a number of groundless
suits of his own with the intent to harass and oppress the defendant,' 4
but this is controverted1 However, an attorney cannot be guilty for
conducting false suits at the behest of clients when the attorney had no
part in instigating their commencement.' 0 Since the crime consists of
Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §3926; Rsv. CODE MONT. (1935) §10936 et seq.; ComP.
STAT. NEBR. (1929) §§28-739, 28-716; NEV. ComP. LAWS (1929) §10051; 39
McKiNNEY's CONSOL. LAWS OF N. Y. (1938) §320 et seq.; Comp. LAws oF N. D.(1913) §9408 et seq.; PAGE'S OHIO GEN. CODE (1939) §12847; 21 OKLA. STAT.
ANN. (1937) §550 et seq.; PunoN's PENNA. STAT. (1930) §171; S. D. CODE(1939) §13.1252; WILLIAM'S TENN. CODE (1934) §11108 et seq.; TEX. CONST.
Art. XVI, §28; VERNON'S PENAL CODE OF TEXAS (1925 Rev.) Art. 430; REV. STAT.
UTAH (1933) §103-26-43 et seq.; PUB. LAWS VT. (1933) §8665; REM. REV.
STAT. WASH. (1932) §2370; Wis. STAT. (1941) §348.325. See 2 THORNTON, AT-
TORNEYS AT LAW (1914) 654; Brooks, Chainperty and Maintenance in The Unitcd
States (1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 421. Under the Texas statute, supra, the common law
has been so modified that in Ackerman v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. App. 260, 61 S. W.
(2d) 116 (1933) an attorney was fined only five dollars upon a conviction for
barratry. See also cases cited note 6 supra.
'McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U. S. 107, 40 S. Ct. 306, 64 L. ed. 481 (1919) uphold-
ing the Texas statute (see note 7 supra).
' State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830); Rex. v. -, 3 Mod. 97,
87 Eng. Rep. 62; Brooks, Champerty and Maintenance in The United States (1916)
3 VA. L. REv. 421.
10 State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830).
2" State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830); Scott v. State, 53 Ga.
App. 61, 185 S. E. 131 (1936).
2 State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830); CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) 607.
'
3 State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CRIMES (4th ed. 1940) 607. In Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Association, 191 Ga. 366,
12 S. E. (2d) 602 (1940) it was held not barratry under statute for bar association
to offer its services gratuitously to those caught in the toils of usurious money-
lenders. In Brush v. Carbondale, 229 IIl. 144, 82 N. E. 252 (1907) where attorney
paid costs and expenses of a test case and after recovery sued client on the con-
tract of employment, who defended that the contract was barratous and unenforce-
able, the court said that the attorney was not engaged in stirring up strife and
litigation, but that what he was doing was of interest to all the citizens of the
commmunity, and allowed recovery on the contract.24 State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830) ; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c.
81, §3.
" WINFIELD, HISTORY OF CONSPIRACY AND ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE (1921)
200, 207; 2 WORDS AND PHRASES, FIRST SERIES (1904) 1312, citing 4 ViN. ABR.
208. See 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES (9th ed. 1877) *266.
" WINFIELD, op. cit. supra note 15, at 208; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §4;
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the practice of stirring up litigation, one act is insufficient ;17 it seems
to be firmly established that three such acts must be shown. 18 An in-
dictment charging defendant as a "common barrator" is sufficient,19 and
need not set out the specific acts to be proved. However, defendant is
entitled to a bill of particulars to enable him to formulate his defense,
and the prosecution may prove only those acts set out in this bill.20
The decision in the instant case has far-reaching possibilities in
strengthening the capacity of the courts and of the bar to deal with
modern barrators, better known as "ambulance chasers." Canon 28 of
the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, 21 pro-
vides that ". . Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofes-
sional, but is indictable at common law. .. ." It is well settled that an
attorney may be suspended or disbarred for such practices, either under
specific statutes or under the power of the court to discipline attorneys
practicing before it.22 Even under the North Carolina State Bar Act,23
it is recognized that the Supreme and Superior Courts retain their power
to disbar attorneys, 24 and this has been done in open court upon a con-
viction for a sexual crime.25 Under the common law an attorney could
be disbarred on conviction of barratry.26 North Carolina has adopted
the common law offense, and under C. S. §417327 the common law pun-
RussELL, loc. cit. supra note 15; 1 BouvIER, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd rev. ed. 1914)
327.
1" Comm. v. Davis, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 432 (1831) ; Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb.
(N. Y.) 580 (1868) ; 4 BL. Comm. *135; RussEL, loc. cit. supra note 15; BOUVIER,
oc. cit. supra note 16; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §5.
18 Comm. v. M'Culloch, 15 Tyng (Mass.) 227 (1818); State v. Noell, 220 Mo.
App. 883, 295 S. W. 529 (1927) ; RUSSELL, loc. cit. supra note 15; BOUVIER, loc. cit.
spra note 16.
1 Comm. v. Davis, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 432 (1831); State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey
Law (S. C.) 379 (1830) ; The Case of Barretry, 8 Co. 36b, 77 Eng. Rep. 528; 4 BL.
Coim. *135; 9 HALSBuRY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (1909) 499; 1 RUSSELL, loc. cit.
supra note 15; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §§5, 11; WINFIELD, loc. cit. supra note
15. See Stratton v. Comm., 10 Metc. (Mass.) 217 (1845); Comm. v. Tubbs, 1
Cush. (Mass.) 2 (1848) ; State v. Noell, 220 Mo. App. 883, 295 S. W. 529 (1927).
" State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey Law (S. C.) 379 (1830) ; Comm. v. Davis, 11 Pick.(Mass.) 432 (1831); HALSBURY, loc. cit. supra note 19; RUSSELL, loc. cit. supra
note 15; HAWK., P. C. (1788) c. 81, §13.
21 Adopted by The North Carolina State Bar, 205 N. C. 853, 873 (1933). See
(1937) 15 N. C. L. Ray. 330, 332; Note 29 infra.
'2 See collection of cases in Note (1931) 73 A. L. R. 401.
'IN. C. Pun. LAWS (1933) c. 210; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §215(1)
et seq.
-' N. C. CoDE ANN. (Miehie, 1939) §215(19) ; In re Brittain, 214 N. C. 95, 197
S. E. 705 (1938); Attorney-General v. Gorson, 209 N. C. 320, 183 S. E. 392
(1935) cert. denied 298 U. S. 662, 56 S. Ct. 752, 80 L. ed. 1387 (1935) ; Attorney-
General v. Winburn, 206 N. C. 923, 175 S. E. 498 (1934); State v. Spivey, 213
N. C. 45, 195 S. E. 1 (1937) ; Note (1938) 16 N. C. L. REV. 377.
26 State v. Spivey, 213 N. C. 45, 195 S. E. 1 (1937).
213 See note 6 supra.
27 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4173. "All misdemeanors, where a specific
punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors at common
law....
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ishment governs. Therefore, upon the conviction of an attorney for
barratry, the Superior Court could, as part of the sentence, order the
convicted attorney's license revoked. Should the Superior Court fail
to do so, the Council of the State Bar could disbar the guilty lawyer for
"commission of a criminal offense showing professional unfitness" 28
as well as for "violation of any of the canons of ethics . . . adopted...
by the council of the North Carolina state bar."2 9
P. DALTON KENNEDY, JR.
Justices of the Peace-Effect of Interest in Fees on Jail Sentence
In it Re Steele' the North Carolina Supreme Court decided that
habeas corpus was not available to test the constitutionality of our jus-
tice of the peace system, whereby in a criminal case, the justice receives
his fee only in the event of conviction.
In this case, S appeared before a justice of the peace in Rockingham,
North Carolina, in answer to a warrant charging him with public drunk-
enness. S pleaded guilty, and the justice ordered that he be imprisoned
for thirty days. Fourteen days later S filed a petition for a wit of habeas
corpus before the judge of the Superior Court in the county in which
S was imprisoned. The judge of the Superior Court held that "the pro-
ceedings and trial before John H. Yates, justice of the peace, of Eldon
Steele were unconstitutional and void." The judgment of the Superior
Court was based on the conclusion that there was a denial of due process
of law since the justice of the peace had a -direct pecuniary interest in
the conviction, one dollar of his compensation being dependent on costs
collected from this defendant upon conviction. For the justice would
have received no fee at all if the defendant had been acquitted. The
Supreme Court, in a review of the decision by certiorari, held that the
judgment of the justice of the peace was not a denial of due process
for if S had not pleaded guilty he could have appealed and had a trial
de novo in the Superior Court. Thus the court distinguished the case
from Tumey v. Ohio.2 The court said, moreover, that "even if the
disqualification of the judge be conceded, by the clear weight of au-
thority the effect would be to render his decision voidable and not
void."3 Finally, the court said that there was authority for the position
that S had waived the disqualification by not making seasonable objec-
tion at the outset of the trial.
The United States Supreme Court, in 1927, dealt with a problem
28 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §215(11), clause 1.
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §215(11), clause 6.
'ln Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 18 S. E. (2d) 132 (1942).
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. ed. 479 (1927).
'IIn Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 689, 18 S. E. (2d) 132, 135 (1942).
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similar to this in Tumey v. Ohio.4 There, after a trial on the merits,
the judge (a mayor) fined the defendant one hundred dollars. Out of
the costs imposed on the defendant the judge received a twelve dollar
fee, and the village, of which he was executive head, received half the
fine. The judge would have received no fee had the defendant been
acquitted. It was shown that the defendant had objected to the judge
on grounds of interest at the outset of the trial, that there was no
provision in the Ohio law for jury trial in such a case, and that appellate
review was confined to questions of law. The Supreme Court said:
"Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the aver-
age man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict
the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the state and the accused 'denies the latter due
process of law."5
In the course of the Tumey decision, Chief Justice Taft mentioned a
number of states in which prevailed the system of compensating the
judges of inferior courts by fees derived from costs paid by convicted
defendants. 6 In all but one of these states the problem of the validity
of a conviction by such courts has been reviewed since the Tumey case.
The decisions have differed in result. Almost all of the courts have
agreed that such pecuniary interest is sufficient to disqualify the judge.
But some have held, as does the North Carolina Court in the instant
case, that the right to have a trial de novo on appeal removes the taint
of unconstitutionality; some have held that the conviction is voidable
and that failure to raise seasonable objection will constitute a waiver;
and others have held that the conviction is absolutely void.
In the first group, i.e. those which have held that the right to a
trial de nrovo immunized the irregularity of the conviction before the
disqualified judge, are Arkansas, Indiana,8 Mississippi,9 and Virginia.10
A U. S. District Court in Kentucky 1 has also reached this result; and
the Supreme Court of New Mexico has approved it by way of dictum. 12
North Carolina, in the instant case, adopts this view of the law.'"
'Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. ed. 749 (1927).
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532, 47 S. Ct. 437, 444, 71 L. ed. 749, 758
(1927).
6 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 526, 47 S. Ct. 437, 442, 71 L. ed. 749, 756(1927).
'Hill v. State, 174 Ark. 889, 298 S. W. 321 (1927).
'Cole v. Wheely, 206 Ind. 461, 190 N. E. 56 (1934) ; Harding v. Minas, 206
Ind. 661, 190 N. E. 862 (1934); State v. Schelton, 205 Ind. 416, 186 N. E. 772
(1933).
9Hitt v. State, 149 Miss. 724, 115 So. 880 (1928) ; Foote v. State, 115 So. 886
(Miss. 1928) ; Jones v. State, 115 So. 886 (Miss. 1928).
10 Brooks v. Potomac, 149 Va. 427, 141 S. E. 249 (1928).1 1Ex Parte Meeks, 20 F. (2d) 543 (W. D. Ky. 1927).
12 State v. Gonzales, 43 N. M. 498, 95 P. (2d) 673 (1940).
"In Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 686, 18 S. E. (2d) 132,134 (1942).
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The theory employed by these states was thus stated by the Missis-
sippi court: "Whatever error was committed by the justice of the peace
in his view of the law, or his determination of the facts was cured by a
full, free, fair, impartial de novo trial."'1 4 The Federal District Court 15
took the view that an act of the state was being looked at, and when
such was the case the question involved was whether there was a denial
of due process by the state. That, said the court, is determined not
merely by the result in one judicial tribunal of the state, but the whole
procedure open to the accused under state law must be examined for the
purpose of determining whether the state law has furnished the means
by which the wrong done in one tribunal may be corrected in another.
Both the Mississippi and the Federal courts were discussing the right
of an accused to habeas corpus when convicted by a judge who had a
pecuniary interest in the conviction.
It is submitted that these courts have taken an unrealistic approach
to the problem. Two unfortunate results follow such a holding. The
first is that the mere availability of a trial de iwvo on appeal cures all
irregularity in the inferior court by effectively immunizing the inferior
court against correction except on appeal. The second unfortunate re-
sult is that in most cases the type of persons usually convicted before a
justice of the peace cannot afford an appeal and are thus forced to
accept the judgment of the prejudiced judge. But this does not justify
the decision of the case by an interested judge. As was said in a West
Virginia case: "It is ordinarily cheaper to pay a moderate fine than
to pay the expenses attendant upon appeal, for which reason many an
innocent man has submitted to an unjust decision in an inferior court.
Right of appeal does not meet the situation. The constitution requires
that the accused shall be tried before a fair and impartial tribunal in
the first instance where he will not face the alternative of paying an
unjust fine or of resorting to the delay, annoyance, and expense of
appeal.
116
The second group of cases reviewing the effect of Tumey v. Ohio
adopts the theory that a judgment by an interested judge is merely
voidable and not void; and that failure seasonably to object waives
the irregularity. The states in this group are Arkansas, 17 Kentucky,' 8
Mississippi,'9 Ohio,20 and West Virginia.2 1 This result has also been
"Hitt v. State, 149 Miss. 724, 728, 115 So. 880, 884 (1928).1 Ex Parte Meeks, 20 F. (2d) 543 (W. D. Ky. 1927).
1" Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 3, 178 S. E. 67, 69 (1935).
'7 Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 213 S. W. 7 (Ark. 1919).
1" Pinkleton v. Lueke, 265 Ky. 84, 90 S. W. (2d) 1103 (1936); Martin v.
Wyatt, 225 Ky. 212, 7 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1928); Wager v. Sizemore, 222 Ky.
306, 300 S. W. 918 (1928); Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 136, 7 S. W. (2d) 836
(1928).
1" Bryant v. State, 146 Miss. 539, 112 So. 676 (1927).
"0 State ex rel. Bowman v. Board of Commissioners, 124 Ohio 174, 177 N. E.
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reached by the Tenth United States Circuit Court of Appeals,2 2 and has
been approved by dictum in New Mexico. 23 It became necessary for
the North Carolina Court in the instant case to follow the majority rule
and hold that the judgment of the justice of the peace was merely
voidable. For the -jurisdiction of the Superior Court in appeals from
a justice of the peace is derivative;24 and hence, if the judgment of the
justice of the peace were void the Superior Court could gain no greater
jurisdiction. Although not necessary to the decision, the court in the
instant case expressed the view that the accused had waived the disquali-
fication of the justice.2 5
It will be noticed that there is some overlapping between the two
groups. Some of the states which appear in the first group also appear
in the second group. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that
in not all of the cases even in the same state is a judgment by the same
inferior court being dealt with, and that possibly appeal with a trial
de -novo lay from one court and not from another. This would explain
the absence of reference to the right of appeal in some cases.26
Undoubtedly the great weight of authority establishes the proposition
that, at common law, the acts of a disqualified judge are not mere nulli-
ties; they are simply erroneous and subject to be reversed or avoided
on proper application, but cannot be impeached collaterally.2 7 A dis-
tinction is drawn between jurisdiction and disqualification. 28 By the
majority rule a judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and sub-
ject to collateral attack. The right to have a disinterested judge hear
the case, however, is a personal privilege (according to the majority
theory), and a judgment rendered by an interested judge is merely
erroneous and not subject to collateral attack. In the West Virginia
case of State v. Simmions it was said: "In considering the problem
271 (1931) ; State ex rel. Atcherson v. Thatcher, 124 Ohio St. 64, 176 N. E. 883
(1931); Stephenson v. State, 119 Ohio St. 352, 164 N. E. 359 (1928); Tari v.
State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N. E. 594 (1927).
1 State v. Simmons, 185 S. E. 417 (W. Va. 1936).
22 Willis v. Scott, 40 F. (2d) 328 (C. ,C. A. 10th, 1929); Owens v. Daney,
36 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929).
"' State v. Gonzales, 43 N. M. 498, 95 P. (2d) 673 (1940).
2 McLarnin v. McIntyre, 167 N. C. 350, 88 S. E. 627 (1914) ; Stacey Cheese
Co. v. Pipkin, 155 N. C. 394, 71 S. E. 442 (1911).
2 In Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 689, 18 S. E. (2d) 132, 135 (1942).
2 For instance, in Hitt v. State, 174 Ark. 889, 298 S. W. 321 (1927), which
relied on the immunizing effect of a trial de nozvo, the appeal was from a mayor's
court, while in Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 213 S. W. 7 (Ark. 1919),
which contained no reference to a right of a trial de novo, the appeal was from
a county court.
" Willis v. Scott, 40 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930) ; Owens v. Daney, 36
F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929) ; Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 471, 159 N. E.
594 (1927); State v. Simmons, 185 S. E. 417 (W. Va. 1936); Note (1919) 5
A. L. R. 1585.
8 Carr v. Duhme, 167 Ind. 76, 78 N. E. 322 (1906) ; Pinkleton v. Lueke, 265
Ky. 84, 95 S. W. (2d) 1103 (1936).
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herein presented, there must be borne in mind the distinction between
a situation wherein there is presented a question of the court's juris-
diction of the subject matter, and a situation involving merely the per-
sonal disqualification of a judge or a justice. When a court presumes
to act in a given case without jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof,
the attempted judicial action is void .... But jurisdiction . . is not the
question in the instant case, for, clearly, justices have jurisdiction of
offenses such as (are) presented here. The pertinent question here is
in respect of the qualification of the justice. '29
There is authority, however, for the proposition that a judgment
rendered by an interested judge is void. In an early Michigan case it
was said: "No judge can sit in his own cause. Should he do so the
decree rendered by him in his own favor would be utterly void. If he
cannot sit, his seat in a judicial sense is vacant, and his acts are without
judicial sanction." 30 Cooley maintains that even the legislature is unable
to empower a party to sit in his own cause. He says: "The judge acting
in such a case is not simply proceeding irregularly, but he is acting
without jurisdiction."31
Where there is a constitutional prohibition against an interested
judge sitting in a case, or where there is a statute which provides that
a certain interest disqualifies a judge, it has been almost uniformly held
that actions by such judge are void.32 It is difficult to see why actions
in violation of such a constitutional limitation, or in violation of such a
statute, should be void, while actions in violation of the general consti-
tutional requirement for due process of law ("law of the land" in North
Carolina) 33 should be merely voidable.34 In most of those states which
hold the acts of an interested judge to be merely voidable the disquali-
fication of the judge is conceded-a disqualification based on the inabil-
ity of the judge to give a fair trial. Yet it has been held that one of
the indispensable elements of due process is a fair and impartial trial.
Thus it appears that a concession of the disqualification of the judge
is a concession of denial of due process.
Further, it has been almost unanimously held by those courts which
have said that the judgment of an interested judge is voidable that the
1
29 State v. Simmons, 185 S. E. 417, 418 (W. Va. 1936).
3 Horton v. Howard, 79 Mich. 642, 644, 44 N. W. 1112, 1114 (1890).
3 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONs (4th ed. 1878) 517.
"Horton v. Howard, 79 Mich. 642, 44 N. W. 1112 (1890); Ex Parte Kelly,
111 Tex. Crim. 57, 10 S. W. (2d) 728 (1928); Ex Parte Binney, 14 S. W. (2d)
63 (Texas 1928). Contra.: Bryant v. State, 146 Miss. 539, 112 So. 676 (1927).
NORTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION, Art. I, §17.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 523, 47 S. Ct. 437, 441, 71 L. ed. 749, 754
(1927) ("But it certainly violates the fourteenth amendment, and deprives a
defendant in a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty or prop-
erty to the judgment of a court the judge of which has a direct, personal, pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.").
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disqualification of the judge could be waived. 35 This seems to be the
general rule; and, although there are statements that due process cannot
be waived,36 many constitutional provisions have been held to be subject
to waiver.37
The question arises, however, as to whether the court was correct
in saying that the defendant in the instant case had waived the dis-
qualification of the trial judge. It is true that he pleaded guilty. That
fact alone, however, should not constitute a waiver3s of, nor should it
detract from, the importance of a fair and impartial judge.39 A citizen
ought not to be deprived of due process of law, though ever so guilty-
if he could be so deprived mob violence would be excused. 40
The court in the instant case bases the waiver on the failure of the
accused to interpose seasonable objection. The Court says: "There is
also authority for the position that ... a failure to raise objection at
the trial, when the party complaining had full knowledge of the dis-
qualification constitutes a waiver.
'41 
"
One of the essential elements of waiver is knowledge.42 No one can
waive a right of which he is ignorant, for waiver is an intentional relin-
quishment of a known right. In a recent case43 the Supreme Court of
" Willis v. Scott, 40 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930); Owens v. Daney,
36 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 10th, 1929) ; Washington Fire Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 213
S. W. 7 (Ark. 1919) ; Pinkelton v. Lueke, 265 Ky. 84, 95 S. W. (2d) 1103 (1936) ;
Martin v. Wyatt, 225 Ky. 212, 7 S. W. (2d) 1048 (1928); Wager v. Sizemore,
222 Ky. 306, 300 S. W. 918 (1928) ; Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 136, 7 S. W. (2d)
836 (1928); Bryant v. State, 146 Miss. 539, 113 So. 676 (1927); Tari v. State,
117 Ohio St. 481, 159 N. E. 594 (1927); State v. Simmons, 117 W. Va. 326,
185 S. E. 417 (1936).
" Simons v. U. S., 119 F. (2d) 539 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941); Note (1928) 23
ILL. L. Rav. 394, 396.
"It Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 689, 18 S. E. (2d) 132, 135 (1942) ; Bates v.
Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 832, 266 S. W. 651 (1924) (the right to be present in
court in a misdemeanor case may be waived) ; Phipps v. Commonwealth, 205 Ky.
832, 266 S. W. 654 (1924) (the right to a trial by a jury of twelve men in a
misdemeanor case may be waived) ; Bonnor v. Commonwealth, 180 Ky. 338, 202
S. W. 676 (1918) (the right of the accused to meet the witness against him face
to face may be waived); SEDGwIcK, CONSTRUcTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY LAW (2d ed. 1874) 88.
38 Although in North Carolina the effect of a plea of guilty is to waive jury
trial, it may be argued that it does not waive the right to have a fair and impartial
judge. When there is a plea of guilty the jury's function is already substantially
performed; hence there is no great harm done to the accused by holding that the
jury has been waived. The judge, however, has important functions to perform
regardless of the plea, and, for that reason, the waiver of the judge should be
expressed more specifically than by a mere plea of guilty.
" Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 535, 47 S. Ct. 437, 445, 71 L. ed. 749, 759
(1927) ("No matter what the evidence was against him [the accused], he had
a right to have an impartial judge.").
"0 Commonwealth v. O'Keefe, 298 Pa. 169, 148 Atl. 73 (1929).
" Ii Re Steele, 220 N. C. 685, 689, 18 S. E. (2d) 132, 135 (1942).
2 Bernhamer v. State, 123 Ind. 577, 24 N. E. 509 (1899) ; Yazoo & Mississippi
Valley Ry. Co. v. Kirk, 102 Miss. 41, 58 So. 710 (1912); Jeffers v. Jeffers, 89
S. C. 244. 71 S. E. 810 (1911) ; Note (1928) 23 ILL. L. REV. 394.
" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. ed. 1461 (1938).
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the United States remanded to a federal district court a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in order for the district court to determine
whether or not there had been an intelligent waiver of a constitutional
right. In that case a layman had proceeded with his own defense "about
as well as the average layman." The record was conflicting as to whether
he had requested counsel, but there was no doubt that he had been
without counsel. It was held that a failure to protest this deprivation
of a constitutional right did not constitute a waiver per se. The Court
said: "It has been pointed out that the courts indulge in 'every reason-
able presumption against waiver of fundamental rights' and that we
'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' The
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver.., must
depend in every case upon the particular facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct
of the accused."
'44
It is submitted that the waiver idea of the North Carolina Court in
the Steele case represents a closer adherence to administrative conven-
ience than to the more humane view of the merits entertained by the
United States Supreme Court. It is difficult to see how it could be said
that the accused, a seventeen-year-old youth,45 without the benefit of
counsel, knowingly waived his right to a fair and unprejudiced judge.
In the third group of cases, reviewing the effect of Tuwney v. Ohio,
it has been held that decisions by judges having a direct interest in the
result are void and subject to collateral attack. Texas40 and Michigan 47
have reached this result along with at least three Federal courts48 in
Kentucky and Oklahoma. One West Virginia case seems to indicate
that that state at one time considered such a judgment void ;49 but this
case seems to have been directly overruled, and evidently that state now
regards such judgments as merely voidable.50 There is either a consti-
tutional or a statutory provision disqualifying a judge for interest in
each of the states (except West Virginia) which hold that the judgment
is void. As pointed out above, it is difficult to see why, if this result
should follow violation of such a constitutional or statutory provision, a
"Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L. ed. 1461,
1466 (1938).
" See Rudd v. Woofolk, 67 Ky. 555, 561 (1868) ("Consent cannot be presumed
against one only constructively before the court, nor against minors. . . ." There
the court was speaking of consent to the trial of a case by a special judge.).
"6Ex Parte Binney, 112 Tex. Cr. 38, 14 S. W. (2d) 63 (1928); Ex Parte
Kelly, 111 Tex. Cr. 57, 10 S. W. (2d) 728 (1928).
"Bliss v. Tyler, 149 Mich. 601, 113 N. W. 317 (1907); Horton v. Howard,
79 Mich. 642, 44 N. W. 1112 (1890).
" Ex Parte Hatem, 38 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; Champlin Refining
Co. v. Corporation Commission, 51 F. (2d) 823 (W. D. Okla., 1931); Ex Parte
Baer. 20 F. (2d) 912 (E. D. Ky., 1912).
" Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S. E. 67 (1935).
"0 State v. Simmons, 185 S. E. 417 (W. Va., 1936).
(Vol. 20
NOTES AND COMMENTS
like result should not also follow violation of a constitutional provision
against an unfair or a partial trial such as is encompassed in the due
process clause.
Since the Tumey decision at least two states have taken legislative
action on the problem. In 1928 Kentucky provided that "The fiscal
courts of the several counties shall fix a reasonable compensation for
county judges for their services in criminal misdemeanor case."51 West
Virginia in 1935 provided that the county should pay all claims of the
justice of the peace out of the general fund, and that the costs col-
lected by the justices should go to the county fund.5 2 Nebraska, men-
tioned by Chief Justice Taft in the Tumey case as being one of the states
which had the fee system, does not fall into the category of those states
which make the compensation of the inferior courts dependent on con-
viction. The justice of the peace in Nebraska is entitled to his fees from
the county if the defendant is either acquitted or fails to pay the
costs.5 3
It is regrettable that the North Carolina Court in the Steele case
chose to ignore the spirit of the Turney decision. In Re Steele presented
an opportunity to correct one of the causes for the evils of the justice
of the peace system. The administration of the public business in the
courts of the justice of the peace has become a scandal.5 4 This is to be
expected as long as the present system of compensation remains.5 5 The
contingent fee basis of compensation presents the justice with the di-
lemma that he must convict so many head a month or go bankrupt.
It is to be hoped that the legislature will take cognizance of the
abuses which exist, and move in the near. future to assure a more im-
partial tribunal in North Carolina's criminal courts of the first instance
by abolishing the system of basing the judge's fees on the number of
convictions in his court.
FRED R. EDNEY, JR.
Lis Pendens-Filing and Cross Indexing--Statutory
Requirements in North Carolina
In an action to foreclose a recorded deed of trust the plaintiff neg-
lected to file statutory notice of lis pendens. While the litigation was
" Session Acts, 1928 Session of the Ky. General Assembly, c. 22.
2 Acts of Legislature, 1935 (W. Va.) cc. 30, 31, 32.
" NEBRASKA COMPILED STATUTES (Brown, 1922) §§2400, 10274. And see Note(1940) 15 IND. L. J. 445.
"Battle, Open, Court (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 349. And see McClamroch, A
Discussion, of the Justice of the Peace Courts in North Carolina (1930) 32 N. C.
BAR Assoc. REPORTS 194.
"Report of the Committee on Justices of the Peace of the North Carolina Bar
Association, (1939) 41 N. C. BAR Assoc. REPORTS 152; Report of the Committee
on Justices of the Peace of North Carolina, (1938) 40 N. C. BAR Assoc. REPORTS
115.
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pending the defendant sold the land involved to third parties who had
no actual knowledge of either the recorded mortgage or the pending
action to foreclose. The North Carolina statute requires all mortgage
foreclosure suits to be brought within ten years from the date of the last
payment on the mortgage.1 Though the original action was instituted
in apt time the purchasers pendente lite were not joined as party de-
fendants until after the lapse of the statutory period. These defendants
pleaded the statute of limitations, and maintained that since no formal
notice of the institution of the suit had been filed the doctrine of lis
pendens should not apply to them. But the court found that no formal
notice of lis pendens was necessary to protect subsequent purchasers,
because the recordation of the mortgage itself gave constructive notice
of the suit to foreclose. Therefore the purchasers were bound by the
foreclosure suit and could not avail themselves of the defense of the
statute of limitations..2
The doctrine of lis pendens is ancient. The principle was originally
found in the Roman civil law and was first clearly formulated in English
law by Lord Bacon, but was applied in practice in the courts long before
his time.3 The essence of the rule is that whoever purchases property
involved directly in a pending litigation from one of the parties thereto
is bound by the outcome of that suit just as if he had been joined as an
original party.4 It is equally applicable at common law and equityY
The rule was first applied to real property. Because of hesitancy of the
courts to restrict unduly the flow of commercial transactions there is
now a difference of opinion as to whether its operation should be ex-
tended. Negotiable instruments are universally recognized as being
beyond the scope of the rule6 and England has refused to apply it to
personal property.7 In the majority of American jurisdictions lis pen-
dens applies to personal property ;8 but there has been no North Caro-
lina decision on this point.9
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §437.
'Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N. C. 725, 18 S. E. (2d)
436 (1942).
'ee Fox v. Reeder, 28 Ohio St. 181, 187 (1875); BENNETT, Lis PENDENS(1887) §§1-11; Note (1932) 12 ORE. L. REV. 68.
' Jarrett v. Holland, 213 N. C. 428, 196 S. E. 314 (1938) ; Jones v. Williams,
155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) ; Williams v. Kerr, 113 N. C. 306, 18 S. E.
501 (1893); Collingwood v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 10 S. E. 868 (1890); Rollins
v. Henry, 78 N. C. 342 (1878); Isler v. Brown, 66 N. C. 557 (1872); Baird v.
Baird, 62 N. C. 317 (1868).
'Rollins v. Henry, 78 N. C. 342 (1878) ; Note (1886) 14 Am. Dec. 775.
6 County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96, 24 L. ed. 977 (1878); BENNETT,
Lis PENDENS (1887) §86; Note (1909) 22 HARV. L. REV. 455.
'Wigram v. Buckley, 3 Ch. 483 (1894); BENNETT, Lis PENDENS (1887) §80;
Graubart, Should Lis Pendens Prevent the Performance of an Executory Con-
tract? (1940) 44 DICK. L. REv. 59, 61: Note (1932) 12 ORE. L. REv. 68.
8 BENFTT, Lis PENDENS (1887) §§81, 82; Notes (1886) 14 Am. Dec. 775,(1934) 8 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 80, 84, The Applicationt of Lis Pendens to Personalty(1934) 47 HARv. L. Rxv. 1023, (1932) 12 ORE. L. REv. 68.
' MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §345.
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The purpose of Us pendens is to render court decisions effective. It
has its basis in public necessity.'0 Without it any judgment involving
the recovery of specific property could be negated by an alienation of
the property during the period of litigation." The plaintiff might have
to bring suit interminably against an endless succession of purchasers
pendente lite.12 But the application of the doctrine was severe; bona
fide purchasers were subjected to considerable hardship. Purchasers
pendente lite suffered financial loss through failure to discover suits
hidden in the impenetrable mazes of the civil dockets. In an effort to
justify the harshness of the rule the courts evolved the theory of con-
structive notice.' 3 The purchaser was presumed to be acquainted with
all litigation in the courts. By searching the dockets he might have
found the action affecting the land he proposed to buy. Therefore, being
on notice, he bought at his peril and thus brought his losses upon him-
self.
But the theory of notice as applied to lis pendens in the absence of
statutes is rather fallacious. 14 Lis pendens applied even when it was
physically impossible for the purchaser to obtain actual knowledge of
the suit.' 5 There was no constructive notice of collateral claims which
were not litigated, even though they were set forth in the pleadings as
clearly as the main issue.' 6 The court in the instant case recognizes
that the statutory notice of Us pendens can be no substitute for recorda-
tion. A lis pendens notice of a suit to foreclose a mortgage is no notice
of the mortgage itself.. If the mortgage is unrecorded the purchaser
pendente lite is considered a purchaser without notice in spite of the
so-called "notice" of the lis pendens.'7 The principle of lis pendens
10 Jarrett v. Holland, 213 N. C. 428, 196 S. E. 314 (1938); Collingwood v.
Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 10 S. E. 868 (1890); Rollins v. Henry, 78 N. C. 342
(1878) ; Taylor v. Kelly, 56 N. C. 240 (1857) (rule based on policy to prevent
alienation of the property by the defendant, hence does not apply to alienation by
the plaintiff) ; Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch. 566 (N. Y., 1815) ; Vicars v. Salyer,
111 Va. 307, 68 S. E. 988 (1910) ; Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. (Va.) 93, 14 Am.
Dec. 766 (1823) ; BENNETT, Lis PENDENS (1887) §14; Notes (1935) 20 IOWA L.
REv. 476, (1933) 6 So. CALIF. L. REV. 346.
"1 Prior to 1919 the "period of litigation" for the purpose of lis pendenls in
North Carolina extended from the time of filing the complaint until the end of
any final rehearing in the Supreme Court. Morgan v. Bostic, 132 N. C. 743, 44
S. E. 639 (1903); Bird v. Gilliam, 125 N. C. 76, 34 S. E. 196 (1899). For col-
lected cases see Notes (1941) 130 A. L. R. 943, (1910) 27 L. R. A. (N.S.) 735,
(1907) 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 443, (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 511. Since 1919 the
statute requiring cross-indexing of lis pendens has provided: "For the purposes
of this section an action is pending from the time of cross-indexing the notice."
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §502.
12 Jarrett v. Holland, 213 N. C. 428, 196 S. E. 314 (1938) ; Jones v. Williams,
155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) ; Rollins v. Henry, 78 N. C. 342 (1878).
"BENNETT, Lis PENDENS (1887) §§17-21.
" Ibid. But ef. Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 151, 19 S. E. 351 (1894).
12 BENNETT, Lis PENDENS (1887) §31.
Geishaker v. Pancoast, 57 N. J. Eq. 60, 40 Atl. 200 (1898); Bellamy v.
Sabine, 1 De G. & J. 566, 44 Eng. Rep. 842 (1877). Contra: Daniel v. Hodges,
87 N. C. 95 (1882). Note (1935) 7 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 219.
' Simmons v. Fleming, 157 N. C. 389, 72 S. E. 1082 (1911) (unrecorded
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should be regarded not as a rule of notice but as a device for maintain-
ing the court's control over property in litigation.
In an attempt to mitigate the harshness of lis pendens the great
majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the constructive notice
theory and have provided by statute for the recordation or registration
of notice of the institution of suits. These statutes were intended to
provide the purchaser with a record notice of the litigation so that he
could more easily guard against buying property which he might lose.
Unfortunately the best results have not been achieved. The common law
doctrine has not been abolished, and wherever the statutes do not apply
the old rules continue in effect.1 8 Most of the statutes relate only to
land. Some refer to actions "affecting any interest in land," but many
apply only to actions "affecting the title to land." The North Carolina
statute is of the latter type.19 Many courts further restrict the scope of
the statutes by refusing to apply them in any instance where the pur-
chaser was put on such inquiry that in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence he might have discovered the pending suit.2 0 The instant case is
the result of such an attitude.
The North Carolina statutes 21 provide: "In actions affecting the
title to real property, the plaintiff . . .or a defendant when he sets up
an affirmative cause of action in his answer . . . if it is intended to affect
real estate, may file with the clerk of each county in which the property
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action . . ." (C.S. 500). "Any
party to an action desiring to claim the benefit of a notice of lis pendens,
whether given formally under this article or in the pleadings filed in
the case, shall cause such notice to be cross-indexed by the clerk of the
deed); Williams v. Kerr, 113 N. C. 306, 18 S. E. 501 (1893); Collingwood v.
Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 10 S. E. 868 (1890) (unrecorded deed) ; Newman v. Chap-
man, 2 Rand. (Va.) 93, 14 Am. Dec. 766 (1823). Contra: Blackwood v. David-
son, 198 Ark. 1055, 132 S. W. (2d) 799 (1939) ; Stone v. Keith, 218 Ky. 11, 290
S. W. 1042 (1927). Notes (1927) 16 Ky. L. J. 75, (1934) 8 WASH. L. REv. 197.
" Rardin v. Rardin, 85 W. Va. 145, 102 S. E. 295 (1920) ; But cf. Collingwood
v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 10 S. E. 868 (1890) ; Note (1921) 10 A. L. R. 306.
" For a good summary of the statutes see Note (1935) 20 IowA L. REv. 476.
2o Conner v. Caldwell, 208 Minn. 502, 294 N. W. 650 (1940) (suit to fore-
close motor lien) ; Palmer v. First National Bank in Rhome, 77 S. W. (2d) 902
(Tex. 1934) (foreclosure of recorded mortgage) ; Holford v. Patterson, 112 Tex.
410, 257 S. W. 213 (1923) (attachment) ; Dick v. Jasper, 195 Ky. 539, 242 S. W.
834 (1922) ; Shumate's Executors v. Crockett, 43 W. Va. 491, 27 S. E. 240 (1897)
(docketed judgments and recorded deed of trust); Empire Land & Canal Co. v.
Engley, 18 Colo. 388, 33 Pac. 153 (1893) (mechanics lien).
21 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§500, 501, 502. §503 requires service of
summons within sixty days after cross-indexing. §504 provides for cancellation
of lis pendens notice. The cross-indexing sections, §§501, 502, were at first enacted
for Buncombe County only. N. C. PuB. LAws 1903, c. 472. They were made
applicable to the entire state in 1919. N. C. PuB. LAws 1919, c. 31. The cross-
indexing statute is still often referred to as the "Buncombe County law." Note
that under §500 the defendant may file a lis pendens notice whenever his affirma-
tive defense affects "real estate" and that the word "title" is not used.
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superior court in a docket ... to be called Record of Lis Pendens ... "
(C.S. 501). "From the cross-indexing of the notice of lis pendens only
is the pendency of the action constructive notice to a purchaser or in-
cumbrancer of the property affected thereby. . . . For the purposes
of this section an action is pending from the time of cross-indexing the
notice." (C.S. 502).
This language is indeed so plain "that he may run that readeth it."
Nevertheless the North Carolina court has refused to apply the statu-
tory requirements wherever there has been any possibility that the pur-
chaser might have been put on constructive notice or inquiry in some
other way.22 Thus under C.S. 500, before the passage of the cross-
indexing sections, formal lis pendens notice was deemed unnecessary
when the action was pending in the same county in which the land was
situated. The filing of the complaint in that county was considered
sufficient notice.2 3 Hence the common law was allowed to continue in
force in these cases. It would be better to have the notice filed in every
county where the land lies, regardless of where the action is pending,24
and it was felt that the cross-indexing statute would bring this about.25
In Jarret v. Hollan&2 6 there is dictum that "where the action is instituted
in the county in which the land is situated, the action itself is notice to
those who seek to deal with the property described in the complaint and
no notice of lis pendens, under C.S. 500, is required, except the proce-
dure now provided by C.S. 501." But Stacy, C. J., in his concurring
opinion in the instant case, reiterates the notion that no notice of lis
pendens is necessary where the action and the land are in the same
county, and applies that idea to the cross-indexing statute. He says that
the cross-indexing statute applies only where notice of Us pendens is
required, and since it is not required where the land and the action are
in the same county, it should follow that the cross-indexing statute is
equally inapplicable in such a case. C.S. 501 requires cross-indexing
wherever any party to an action desires to claim the benefit of a notice
of lis pendens, "whether given formally under this article or in the
pleadings filed in the case.. . ." When the action and the land were in
the same county the notice of lis pendens was previously given in the
"2 No formal lis pendens notice is necessary where the purchaser has actual
notice. Morris v. Basnight, 179 N. C. 298, 102 S. E. 389 (1920). Though this
is inconsistent with the general spirit of the North Carolina recording act it is
not contrary to the terms of the lis pendens statute.
23 Brinson v. Lacy, 195 N. C. 394, 142 S. E. 317 (1928) (torrens suit) ; Powell
v. Dail, 172 N. C. 261, 90 S. E. 194 (1916); Lamm v. Lamm, 163 N. C. 71, 79
S. E. 290 (1913) ; Jones v. Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) ; Arring-
ton v. Arrington, 114 N. C. 151, 19 S. E. 351 (1894); Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C.
234 (1878); Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 1085.
2' See Collingwood v. Brown, 106 N. C. 362, 368, 10 S. E. 868, 870 (1890);
Todd v. Outlaw, 79 N. C. 234, 241 (1878).2 McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §342.
20 213 N. C. 428, 430, 196 S. E. 314, 316 (1938).
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pleadings. 27 It would seem that the statute now directly requires cross-
indexing in every county. In his quotation of the statute the Chief
Justice conveniently omitted the statement as to notice given by the
pleadings.2 8 His concurring opinion may possibly be adopted as the
law on this point and as a result every title searcher will be forced to
return to examination of the voluminous civil dockets to satisfy himself
that the" land is not involved in some litigation pending in the same
county.
The majority based its decision on the theory that the notice of lis
pendens was unnecessary in an action to foreclose a recorded mortgage
because the recordation of the mortgage was enough to put the pur-
chaser on inquiry, so that through the exercise of reasonable diligence
he might have discovered the pending suit. Recordation is absolutely
necessary in North Carolina to prevent subsequent purchasers from
taking priority. Even actual notice is no substitute.29 Neither is a notice
of lis pendens of a suit to foreclose a mortgage a sufficient notice to
subsequent purchasers of the existence of the unrecorded mortgage
itself. Also, if a mortgage is given or a deed executed prior to the
commencement of a suit affecting the land, but not recorded until the
litigation has begun (with proper lis pendens notice filed), the holder
thereof is considered a purchaser pendente lite.3 0 This stress on recor-
dation is necessary to carry out the purpose of the recording acts, i.e., to
provide one place-the record-to which the public may look to deter-
'mine the validity of titles.3 ' The Record of Lis Pendens might cer-
tainly be called a part of the "record." The mortgage itself and the suit
to foreclose it are two different things. The fact that knowledge of the
mortgage might lead to knowledge of the suit does not make for incon-
sistency between the lis pendew statute and the recordation act. One
does not destroy the other. Certainly the court should have allowed the
legislature to require the recordation of two different things at two
different places in the record.3 2 The result of the instant case is to
diminish rather than increase the emphasis usually placed on record
notice in this state. The title searcher will now have to go outside the
record, i.e., either to the mortgagee or the "multitudinous files of civil
actions," to determine whether a foreclosure suit has been instituted.
All of the North Carolina cases are distinguishable from the prob-
-" In order to give effective notice the pleadings had to contain an adequate
description of the land. Badger v. Daniel, 77 N. C. 251 (1877).2' See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N. C, 725, 731, 18 S. E.
(2d) 436, 441 (1942) (concurring opinion).
"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3309; Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C.
406. 196 S. E. 352 (1938); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697(1925) ; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903).
" See note 17 supra. 3 See note 29 supra.
" Jones v. McNarrin, 68 Me. 334 (1878).
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lem in hand-either because of differences in the fact situations or
because they antedate the cross-indexing statute.= In other jurisdic-
tions there is authority to support the instant decision by reasoning
from analogous fact situations, 34 but also almost direct authority to
the contrary has been discovered. 35 The Arkansas case of Shouse v.
Scol 6ul 36 is almost precisely in point with the instant case-the differ-
ences serving only to delineate more clearly the problem involved. In
the instant case the title was never actually searched. In the Shouse
case the title was searched and the purchaser obtained actual knowledge
of a recorded mortgage. In Arkansas the mortgagee is required to
record part payments on the margin of the record of the mortgage. In
Arkansas, as in North Carolina, the statute of limitations on fore-
closure suits runs from the time of the last payment after the mortgage
was due.V As no part payment had been registered within the statutory
period the Arkansas purchaser considered it safe to buy the land. He
did not know that a timely foreclosure action had been instituted and
was in the process of litigation, because no notice of lis pendens had
been filed. Under a lis pendens statute of sufficient similarity to the
North Carolina act for the hvo to be interpreted alike,3 8 the Arkansas
court protected the purchaser pendente lite and upheld his defense, of
the statute of limitations. It would seem that this case reaches the more
logical result. Though the institution of suit to foreclose a mortgage
will keep the lien alive for the purpose of tolling the statute of limita-
tionss 9 this should only apply as to the parties to the suit, and where
no lis pendens notice has been filed innocent third-party purchasers
should be protected. The suit in such case is not instituted against the
purchaser until he is joined as a defendant.40 If by that time the statu-
tory period has expired the action should be barred as against the pur-
" Pierce v. Mallard, 197 N. C. 679, 150 S. E. 342 (1929) (attachment recorded
and cross-indexed-property thereby taken in custodia legis and no necessity for
lis pendens) ; Threlkeld v. Malcragson, 198 N. C. 186, 151 S. E. 99 (1929) (spit
to collect note secured by mortgage but not to foreclose mortgage itself) ; Jones v.
Williams, 155 N. C. 179, 71 S. E. 222 (1911) (suit to foreclose recorded mortgage
prior to cross indexing statute and brought in the county where the land lay) ;
see Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N. C. 725, 736, 18 S. E. (2d)
436, 444 (1942) (Mr. Justice Seawell dissenting) and cases cited.
"See note 20 supra.
Blackwood v. Davidson, 198 Ark. 1055, 132 S. W. (2d) 799 (1939) (fore-
closure of vendor's lien) ; Jordan v. Hargis, 156 Ark. 408, 246 S. W. 476 (1923)(mortgage foreclosure) ; Perkins v. Oglivie, 140 Ky. 412, 131 S. W. 200 (1910);
Foster v. Warren, 39 Cal. (2d) 506, 103 P. (2d) 591, 594 (1940}.
"200 Ark. 441, 139 S. W. (2d) 240 (1940).
'7 Compare N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2594 with ARK. DIGEST ANN.
(Pope, 1937) §9465.
"ARK. DIGEST ANN. (Pope, 1937) §8959.
" Harris v. Davenport, 132 N. C. 697, )4 S. E. 406 (1903) ; Wasson v. Beek-
man, 188 Ark. 895, 68 S. W. (2d) 93 (1934).
"'Jones v. Vanstory, 200 N. C. 582, 157 S. E. 867 (1931) ; Hatch v. Alamance
R.R. Co., 183 N. C. 617, 112 S. E. 529 (1922).
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chaser.41 The plaintiff should lose through his own neglect in not filing
proper notice to protect third persons.
The argument advanced by the majority in the instant case that a
foreclosure suit is not an action "affecting the title" to land and hence
not within the scope of the statute seems illogical. True, North Carolina
being a "title theory" jurisdiction, in this state the legal title is recog-
nized as being transferred to the mortgagee, or to the trustee under
the deed of trust. The mortgagor retains only an equity of redemp-
tion. However, the legal title given to the mortgagee is subject to
defeasance by payment of the mortgage and technically the foreclosure
suit does more than merely wipe out the equity of redemption, for the
relief requested is that the land be sold and the title conveyed to the
purchaser. The foreclosure suit, and sale pursuant thereto, renders the
title indefeasable and actually transfers it to the purchaser at the sale.
To say that the suit does not affect the title42 is to place too great, and
too inconsistent, an emphasis on technicalities with consequent disregard
for the realistic features of the situation.43
When a careful title searcher finds a recorded mortgage he makes a
diligent inquiry as to its actual status. He does not rely on the absence
of lis pendens notice. If the title had been searched in the instant case
there is little doubt that the foreclosure suit would have been discovered.
On this point the instant case presents only an academic problem and is
of little practical significance. As a general rule it is true that whatever
puts a person on inquiry is constructive notice to him of all facts which
he could have discovered by reasonable investigation pursuant to such
inquiry,44 but this rule should not have been adhered to in the face of a
specific legislative pronouncement of policy.
As a result of the instant case the notice of lis pendens is abolished
in mortgage foreclosure suits. If the mortgage is unrecorded a Us
pendens notice of the foreclosure action is immaterial; if the mortgage
is-recorded the lis pendens notice is now unnecessary. But only a rela-
tive few of the mortgage foreclosures in this state are obtained by court
order. Most of them are consummated under the power of sale contained
in the mortgage or deed of trust, and lis pendens does not apply to
"'Stancil v. Spain, 133 N. C. 76, 45 S. E. 466 (1903). A purchaser pendente
lite may get the land by adverse possession. Fox v. Reeder, 28 Ohio St. 181(1875); Blake v. Heyward, Bail. Eq. 208 (S. C. 1831). But cf. Parker's Adm'r.
v. Clarkson, 39 W. Va. 184, 19 S. E. 431 (1894) (delay in litigation due to fault
of defendant).
41 "Title is the means whereby the owner of lands has the just possession of
his property." Horney v. Price, 189 N. C. 820, 825, 128 S. E. 321, 323 (1925).
"See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Knox, 220 N. C. 725, 732, 736,
18 S. E. (2d) 436, 442, 444 (1942) (dissenting opinions) and cases cited.
"Hargett v. Lee, 206 N. C. 536, 174 S. E. 498 (1934) ; Wynn v. Grant, 166
N. C. 39, 81 S. E. 949 (1914); Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579
(1903) ; Bolles v. Chauncey, 8 Conn. 389 (1831).
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such procedures. This, coupled with the established practice of title
examiners, diminishes the actual importance of the majority opinion
in the instant case. But the concurring opinion of Mr. Chief Justice
Stacy to the effect that no cross-indexing is necessary where the land
and the action are in the same county will, if adopted, impose a very
real burden on title searchers.
The North Carolina court has often said that the doctrine of lis
pendens is founded on public policy; that it is harsh in its operation
whether founded on policy or notice; and that in order to acquire its
protection the plaintiff should strictly conform to all its require-
ments.45 New Jersey has gone so far as to say that the statutory re-
quirements for giving notice, being for the protection of the public,
cannot be waived; and that failure to file the notice will constitute a
valid affirmative defense to the action even though no third parties have
been affected. 46 It is felt that the Shouse case, in protecting the inno-
cent purchaser where no Us pendens notice was filed, adopted the proper
progressive attitude, and that it would have been better if the North
Carolina court had given effect to the manifest intention of the legis-
lature. Because of the wide split in the court there is some hope that
the instant case will be overruled. It is also believed that the North
Carolina statute is too limited by its terms, and should be amended to
cover actions affecting any interest in land.
JOHN T. KILPATRICK, JR.
Partition-Tenants in Common-Estoppel
Tenants in common owning a mineral interest in land contracted to
lease same for twenty-six years in consideration of lessee's covenant
to pay certain royalties during this period. Thereafter the lessee pur-
chased the interest of one of the cotenants. Three years before the
lease expired, lessee-tenant instituted suit to have the mineral interest
sold for partition. Held: Lessee-tenant estopped to demand sale for
partition prior to expiration of lease since such sale would destroy
lessor-tenant's rights guaranteed under the lease (i.e., payment of
royalties).'
" Powell v. Dail, 172 N. C. 261, 90 S. E. 194 (1916) ; "The rule lis pendens,
while founded on principles of public policy and absolutely necessary to give
effect to the decrees of the Courts, is nevertheless, in many instances, very harsh
in its operation; and one who relies upon it to defeat a bona fide purchaser must
understand that his case is strictissiin juris." Arrington v. Arrington, 114 N. C.
151, 159, 19 S. E. 351, 354 (1894) ; Badger v. Daniel, 77 N. C. 251 (1877) ; Isler v.
Brown, 66 N. C. 557 (1872) ; see note 10 supra; Notes (1930) 3 DAK. L. REv. 60,
(1929) 7 TEX. L. REV. 481.
" Workmen's Building & Loan Association of City of Newark v. Hunger, 12
N. J. Misc. 810, 175 A. 810 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
' Carolina Mineral Co. v. Young, 220 N. C. 287, 17 S. E. (2d) 119 (1941).
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The object of partition proceedings is to enable those who own
property as joint tenants or coparceners or tenants in common to sever
the common holding and vest in each a sole estate in the land.2 Gen-
erally, every tenant in common is entitled, as a matter of right, to
partition.$ But this right is subject to some qualification. By statute
in most, if not all, of the states the court may decree a sale of the land
and a division of proceeds instead of partition in kind.4 In North
Carolina, ordinarily, a tenant in common is entitled to actual partition.3
But where actual partition cannot be had without injury to some or all
of the parties,8 or if property cannot be fairly divided,7 the land may be
sold for a division of proceeds. Whether the situation demands an
actual partition or a sale for partition involves a question of fact for
the trial judge, and not an issue of fact for the jury.8
In North Carolina, partition has been granted where: one tenant
had given a mortgage on his one-half undivided interest ;9 one tenant
had purchased the undivided interest of one of several other tenants ;1O
a will devised land to nine tenants in common;1 a trust had been
created in the land by one of the tenants (partition sale allowed, and
rights of trustee and beneficiaries preserved in that share of proceeds
of sale) ;12 tenants owned mill (sale for partition ordered because from
nature of property it could not be divided without prejudice to interest
of all parties);13 a tenant was entitled to a homestead against a judg-
ment lien (partition sale allowed, his share of the proceeds reserved
and his homestead right therein protected) ;14 holder of a life estate
'4 THoMPsoN, RE.AL PROPERTY (Perm. ed., 1940) §1979.
'Willard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 818, 36 L. Ed. 644 (1892);
Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N. E. (2d) 392 (1940) (and cases cited);
Hyman v. Edwards, 217 N. C. 342, 7 S. E. (2d) 700 (1940); Talley v. Murchi-
son, 212 N. C. 205, 193 S. E. 148 (1937); Barber v. Barber, 195 N. C. 711, 143
S. E. 469 (1928) ; Wisely v. Findley, 3 Rand. (Va.) 361, 15 Am. Dec. 712 (1825);
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §474, n. 78.
'2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §479, n. 43.
'Hyman v. Edwards, 217 N. C. 342, 7 S. E. (2d) 700 (1940)' Talley v.
Murchison, 212 N. C. 205, 193 S. E. 148 (1937) ; Barber v. Barber, 195 N. C. 711,143 S. E. 469 (1928); Foster v. Williams, 182 N. C. 632, 109 S. E. 834 (1921);
-Haddock v. Stocks, 167 N. C. 70, 83 S. E. 9 (1914) ; Tayloe v. Carrow, 156 N. C.
6, 72 S. E. 76 (1911); Gillespie v. Allison, 115 N. C. 542, 20 S. E. 627 (1893);
Holmes v. Holmes, 55 N. C. 334 (1856).6N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3233.TTayloe v. Carrow, 156 N. C. 6, 72 S. E. 76 (1911). As to when sale will be
allowed in other jurisdictions, see FREEMAN, COTENANCY (1882) §537.
8 Tally v. Murchison, 212 N. C. 205, 193 S. E. 148 (1937) ; Barber v. Barber,
195 N. C. 711, 143 S. E. 469 (1928); Vanderbilt v. Roberts, 162 N. C. 273, 78
S. E. 156 (1913); Ledbetter v. Pinner, 120 N. C. 455, 27 S. E. 123 (1897).9 Rosten v. Huggins. 216 N. C. 386, 5 S. E. (2d) 162 (1939).
" Crawford v. Crawford, 214 N. C. 614, 200 S. E. 421 (1939).
"
1Haddock v. Stocks, 167 N. C. 70, 80 S. E. 9 (1914).
Is Barber v. Barber, 195 N. C. 711, 143 S. E. 469 (1928).
's Holmes v. Holmes, 55 N. C. 334 (1856).
14 Smith v. Eakes, 212 N. C. 382, 193 S. E. 393 (1937) ; Holley v. White, 172




and an owner in fee were cotenants in possession ;15 grantee of husband
became a tenant in common with divorced wife ;16 tenant who had made
improvements was entitled to have allotted to her the part of property
improved ;17 widow's dower had already been allotted in land out of
husband's interest as tenant in common (sale for partition allowed) ;18
actual partition could not be made because of small number of acres to
which each tenant was entitled in the division, thus partition sale al-
lowed. 19
On the other hand, partition in North Carolina has been denied in
the following situations: where land was devised to a daughter for life,
with remainder to her surviving children (partition denied until after
death of life tenant) ;20 similiter, where there was a devise of a life
estate to W, with a reversionary expectancy in the heirs of the devisor ;21
during minority of devisees under a will providing that grandchildren
hold as tenants in common until the youngest cotenant attain the age
of twenty-one.22  Moreover, partition is denied where the tenants in
common are not in possession, 23 and a parol partition is not enforced
when not followed by possession sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of adverse possession.
2 4
No general rule as to when partition will be granted or denied seems
deducible from the foregoing holdings. Rather, the results appear to
vary with the particular facts of each case. Nevertheless, even though
facts exist which ordinarily would result in partition being granted, that
right is not so absolute that a cotenant may not, either by his acts or
agreements, preclude himself from asserting it.2 5 It is established that
15 McEachern v. Gilchrist, 75 N. C. 196 (1876).16Mc~innon, Currie & Co. v. Caulk, 167 N. C. 411, 83 S. E. 559 (1914).
"'Jenkins v. Strickland, 214 N. C. 441, 199 S. E. 612 (1938) (value of land
assessed as if no improvements had been made).1 3Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Watkins, 215 N. C. 292, 1 S. E. (2d) 853
(1939) (other tenant in common entitled to sale for partition-for this right could
have been enforced against the husband prior to his death, and the same right
exists against the widow's dower, since her dower in land is but a continuation of
her husband's estate).
" Tally v. Murchison, 212 N. C. 206, 193 S. E. 148 (1937).
" Ex parte Miller, 90 N. C. 625 (1884) ; Williams v. Hassell, 74 N. C. 434
(1876) (until daughter's death it cannot be known who are the remaindermen).
21 Wood v. Sugg, 91 N. C. 93 (1884).
"' Greene v. Stadiem, 198 N. C. 445, 152 S. E. 398 (1935) ; Blake v. Blake,
118 N. C. 575, 24 S. E. 424 (1896). See note (1921) 14 A. L. R. 1238, 1245.
"
5Spring Green Church v. Thornton, 158 N. C. 119, 73 S. E. 810 (1912);
Wood v. Sugg, 91 N. C. 93 (1884); Clemmons v. Drew, 55 N. C. 314 (1856).2
, Tuttle v. Warren, 153 N. C. 459, 69 S. E. 426 (1910).
"5 Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 639, 48 N. E. 694, 62 Am. St. Rep. 411 (1897);
Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N. E. (2d) 392 (1940) (and cases cited);
Eberts v. Fisher, 54 Mich. 294, 20 N. W. 80 (1884) ; Coleman v. Coleman, 19 Pa.
St. 100, 57 Am. Dec. 641 (1852); 2 TIFFANY. REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939)
§474, n. 82; FREEMAN, COTENANCY (1882) §442.
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such agreements may be either express20 or implied,27 or even oral
where acted upon. 2  To be enforceable this waiver or postponement
agreement must extend only for a reasonable time.29 In this connection,
both express and implied agreements not to partition property for five
years,30 eight years,31 eighteen years, 32 and twenty-five years 33 have been
held reasonable. Where no definite time is stipulated, the reasonable-
ness of the time for which an agreement may preclude the right to
partition depends upon a consideration of the lawful purposes for which
the promise is made, and the time to be consumed in its performance.3 4
However, if the agreement is for perpetual forbearance from seeking
partition,3 5 or operates as an unreasonable restriction on the use and
enjoyment of the property,3 6 it is void as unduly restricting the free
alienation of the property. And from general property rules it has
been determined that persons deriving title through an instrument con-
taining a provision against partition are bound thereby.3 7 This rule is
also subject to the requirement of reasonableness.
The statement that partition is a matter of right is also subject to
the operation of estoppel. For example, partition has been denied
under the estoppel theory: where heirs agreed to "draw lots" for shares
in the land;38 where property was purchased for speculative purposes
"Hunt v. Wright, 47 N. H. 396, 93 Am. Dec. 451 (1867); Marchland v.
Marsh, 280 Pa. 292, 124 Atl. 427 (1924).
"'Henderson v. Henderson, 136 Iowa 564, 114 N. W. 178 (1907) ; Eberts v.
Fisher, 54 Mich. 294, 20 N. W. 80 (1884) ; Avery v. Payne, 12 Mich. 540 (1864);
Roberts v. Wallace, 100 Minn. 359, 111 N. W. 289, 117 Am. St. Rep. 701 (1907);
McInteer v. Gillespie, 31 Okla. 644, 122 Pac. 184 (1912). Contra: Hayne y.
Gould (C. C. S. D., 1893), 54 F. 951 (partition allowed).
2Hensler v. Alberding, 86 Ind. App 372, 158 N. E. 243 (1927); Arnold v.
Arnold, 308 111. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1925); Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 639, 48
N. E. 924, 62 Am. St. Rep. 441 (1897); Faulk v. Faulk, 180 So. 887 (La. App.,
1938). Contra: Milburn v. Weminpe, 156 La. 759, 101 So. 132 (1924) ; Brands v.
Cassedy, 124 N. J. Eq. 417, 1 A. (2d) 639 (1938) affd. 125 N. J. Eq. 346, 5 A.(2d) 685 (1939) (oral agreements of this character may not be enforced because
they violate the statute of frauds).2 Rayhol Co. v. Holland, 110 Conn. 516, 148 At. 358 (1930); Roberts v.
Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N. E. (2d) 392 (1940); Chadwick v. Blades, 210 N. C.
609, 188 S. E. 198 (1936).
SRoberts v. Wallace, 100 Mimn. 359, 111 N. W. 289, 117 Am. St. Rep. 701
(1907) ; Yglesias v. Dewey, 60 N. J-. Eq. 62, 47 Aa. 59 (1900).
1 w v. Coddington, 72 Hun. 147, 25 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1893).3 Friesner v. Friesner, 193 Iowa 576, 187 N. W. 437 (1922).
"
3 Arnold v. Arnold, 308 Ill. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1923).
Smith v. Brasseal, 213 Ala. 387, 105 So. 199 (1925).
Smith v. Brasseale, 213 Ala. 387, 105 So. 199 (1925) ; Vollmer v. Wheeler,
42 Cal. App. 1, 183 Pac. 264 (1919). Etnier v. Pascoe, 275 Pa. 308, 119 AtI. 406
(1923).
"0Roberts v. Jones, 307 Mass. 504, 30 N. E. (2d) 392 (1940) ; Haeussler v.
Missouri Iron Co., 110 Mo. 188, 19 S. W. 75 (1892).37 Winemiller v. Mossberger, 355 Ill. 145, 188 N. E. 903 (1933) ; Voellinger
v. Kirchner, 314 Ill. 398, 145 N. E. 638 (1924) ; Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 222 (1883).
'"Hensler v. Alberding, 86 Ind. App. 372, 158 N. E. 243 (1927).
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such as real estate development ;39 where a contract between cotenants
gave each cotenant the right to sell, but not to partition, his interest in
the land ;40 where lessee, so long as he performed terms of lease, was
privileged upon termination of lease to remain in possession for another
ten years ;41 where, by terms of a deed, grantees were to hold premises
in common with other tenants without partition or division;42 where
heirs leased property to a widow for her lifetime ;43 and where a de-
clared trust was to continue until a certain mortgage indebtedness was
discharged.44  The principle which seems to underly these cases is that
the court will not award a partition to one in violation of his own agree-
ment, or in violation of a condition or restriction imposed upon the
estate by one through whom he claims.
By the weight of authority, as between cotenants, partition by sale
is the only proper method of partition of property in minerals, oil, and
gas, considered separately from the soil.45  An existing lease on such
property should be no obstacle to partition,46 for partition would be
made subject to the lease.4T But, as in the principal case, where the
lessee buys in as cotenant and later seeks a sale of the land for the
purpose of dividing proceeds, or to evade his contractual obligations,
the rights of the parties are subject to radical change. This case, one
of first impression in North Carolina, placed before our court a prac-
tically equal division of authority in other jurisdictions. In Hill v.
Reno, 48 land was leased for twenty years and the lessor of the premises
died leaving several heirs at law to whom the property descended as
,oMcInteer v. Gillespie, 31 Okla. 644, 122 Pac. 184 (1912).
,Chadwick v. Blades. 210 N. C. 609, 188 S. E. 198 (1936).
'
1 Eberts v. Fisher, 54 Mich. 294, 20 N. W. 80 (1913).
"Hunt v. Wright, 47 N. H. 396, 93 Am. Dec. 451 (1867) (such a condition
held not invalid as a restraint of alienation, but only a partial and temporary
restriction as to mode of occupation).
"Martin v. Ireland, 320 Mo. 617, 85 S. W. (2d) 900 (1928) ; cf. Henderson
v. Henderson, 136 Iowa 564, 114 N. W. 178 (1907) (widow to hold land during
her widowhood).
" Springer v. Bradley, 188 S. W. 175 (Mo. Super., 1916).
"'Osborn v. Osborn, 267 Ky. 757, 103 S. W. (2.4) 262 (1937); Warfield
Natural Gas Co. v. Cassady, -266 Ky. 217, 98 S. W. (2d) 495 (1936) ; Coker v.
Vierson, 170 Okla. 528, 41 Pac. (2d) 95 (1935); Hall v. Douglas, 102 W. Va.
400, 135 S. E. 282 (1926). See also 20 R. C. L. (1st ed., 1918) 775, n. 18 and cases
cited.
"Willard v. Willard, 145 U. S. 116, 12 Sup. Ct. 818, 36 L. ed. 644 (1892);
Arnold v. Arnold, 308 Ill. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1923) ; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 265
Ill. 48, 106 N. E. 470 (1914) ; Lucy v. Kelly, 117 Va. 318, 84 S. E. 661 (1915) ;
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §476, n. 14; 20 R. C. L. (1st ed., 1918)
741, n. 14. Contra: Cannon v. Lomax, 29 S. C. 369, 7 S. E. 529 (1888) ; McMullen
v. Blecker, 64 W. Va. 88, 60 S. E. 1093 (1908) (partition not allowed until lease
expires).
"
TBlakeslee v. Blakeslee, 265 Il1. 48, 106 N. E. 470 (1914); Henderson v.
Henderson, 114 N. W. 178, 136 Iowa 564 (1907) ; Peterman v. Kingsley, 140 Wis.
666, 123 N. W. 137 (1909).
18 112 Ill. 154, 54 Am. Rep. 222 (1883).
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tenants in common. When lessee purchased from one of the heirs his
interest in the reversion in fee, and later initiated partition proceedings,
the court held that the right to partition was imperative and absolute
even though such a ruling necessitated sale of the premises. The court
based its decision on the ground that if one of the tenants may demand
partition without violating the rights of the other tenants, then the
lessee, purchaser of the interest of one of the tenants, is entitled to
this same right. Also in Peterinan v. Kingsley,49 where the lease on
certain real estate of a business block was for five years, and after two
years the lessee purchased the interest of one of the cotenants and
subsequently instituted partition proceedings, the court found that the
property could not be partitioned in kind, and ordered a sale. This
ruling was based on a Wisconsin statute which provided that tenants
in common holding an estate in possession of lands are entitled to
partition. Thus, when the lessee purchased the interest of one of the
cotenants, he acquired all the property rights, including the right to
partition, that were formerly vested in that cotenant.
On the other hand, in Mclntire v. Midwest Theatres Co,.,50 where
the cotenants executed a ten-year lease, and the lessee after two years
purchased the interest of one of the cotenants and by contract with the
other cotenant agreed to pay certain rents secured by a mortgage on
the property, in a subsequent partition suit the court held that the les-
see-tenant had contracted away his right of partition. Likewise in
Arnold v. Arnold,5 1 it was held that where one cotenant leased his
interest in the property to the other cotenant for twenty-five years, and
the lessee-cotenant thereafter made leases on portions of the lots with
numerous party wall agreements respecting the property, the lessee-
tenant was later estopped from seeking partition. The court based its
ruling on the ground that there was no way to preserve the respective
rights of the parties under the leases and agreements to which partition
would be subject.
Considering the circumstances of the principal case, it seems that
the North Carolina court reached the better conclusion by applying the
reasoning of the latter two cases. The lessee had contracted to mine
the property for twenty-six years and had guaranteed the cotenants
certain royalties during this period. The fact that the lessee subse-
quently purchased the interest of one of the cotenants should not permit
him to escape his contractual obligations to the other. For to enforce
a sale against the lessor-tenant would deny him royalties guaranteed
under the contract, unless he should wish to protect his rights by pur-
140 Wis. 666, 123 N. W. 137 (1909).
58 Colo. 559, 298 Pac. 959 (1931).
S308 II. 365, 139 N. E. 592 (1923).
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chasing the property at the partition sale. Obviously, the lessor-tenant
should not be burdened with this additional expense. Thus, the court
properly concluded that partition, either actual or by sale, could in no
way preserve the respective rights of the parties under the lease. There-
fore, according to the better and more equitable view, the lessee-tenant
was correctly held to be estopped to demand sale for partition prior to
the expiration of his existing lease.
WirLIAM J. RENDL-EMAN.
Pleadings-Libelous Pleadings-Estoppel-Res Judicata
Plaintiff in a former action had sought to recover a death benefit
fund and a year's allowance, claiming to be the wife of one J. M. Har-
shaw, deceased. Defendants were the heirs of said Harshaw, in pos-
session of his assets and estate. Defendants pleaded in that action that
plaintiff was not the wife of Harshaw, but had lived with him illegally
(thus implying that the children of that union were illegitimate). The
judgment therein was for plaintiff. In a second action plaintiff sought
to obtain allotment of dower, and defendants repeated the same answer
-that plaintiff was not legally the wife of Harshaw. On the basis of
this second answer by the defendants the plaintiff brings this present
action for libel, claiming that it was actionable defamation for the de-
fendants to assail her virtue in the second suit when it had already been
determined in the first suit that her cohabitation with Harshaw was
lawful. Held: since the matter had already been settled in the prior
action, the second pleading of illegal cohabitation was barred by estop-
pel, and so was irrelevant. Plaintiff should therefore be allowed dam-
ages for defamation.1
As Justice Devin states in the present case, "Undoubtedly the gen-
eral rule is that pleadings are privileged when pertinent and relevant
to the subject under judicial inquiry, however false and malicious the
defamatory statements may be." This particular infringement of per-
sonal rights is permitted because public policy favors protecting one
having what he believes is a good cause of action from being forced to
plead at his own risk.2
It is readily seen why the court would desire to award damages to
the defamed woman in this case even in the event that the law was not
entirely favorable. "Fireside equity" and a sense of natural justice
work strongly in her favor. Defendants must have known from the
first action that their statement as to plaintiff's incontinence would not
prevail. Also the court may have been influenced by the fact that North
IHarshaw v. Harshaw, 220 N. C. 145, 16 S. E. (2d) 666 (1941).
'Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 360 (1920); HARPER, ToRTs
(1933) §§247-248, n. 34.
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Carolina law has traditionally demanded a high degree of respect for a
virtuous woman's reputation. Defamation of chastity is one of the three
types of defamation made subject to criminal punishment by legislative
enactment.3
The rationale which the court offered was that since the defendants
were estopped to plead that the plaintiff was not the legal wife of Har-
shaw, that fact was irrelevant, and so comes within the exception that
libelous matter in pleadings is actionable when irrelevant. It seems
obvious that this rationale was used to a large extent only to back up
the court's preconceived notion as to how the case should be decided.
For by no stretch of the imagination does it seem in actuality to be
irrelevant to plead that a woman seeking dower was not the wife of
the deceased man. This is not only relevant, but it is very material,
and, in fact, is one of the most generally recognized defenses to an action
for allotment of dower.4 It would seem that when a statement is in
truth relevant it should be looked upon by the court as such, irrespec-
tive of any consideration that the statement cannot, for other reasons,
have any effect upon the decision of the case.5 It is submitted that the
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§4230, 2432.
'Bannister v. Bannister, 150 S. C. 411, 148 S. E. 228 (1929); 2 TFFANY,
R.AL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §488.
"IRRELEVANCY AND PRAcTIcAL POLIcY DISTINGUISHa_. A fact may be logically
relevant, and thus far admissible, and yet be excluded by reason of one of the
auxiliary principles of policy.... ." 1 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §29(a).
In none of the various instances in which evidence is usually ruled unusable
for reasons of public policy does it seem that such evidence has on that account
been held irrelevant. "That most of the characteristic rules of admissibility are
rules which do not prescribe anything about the relevancy or probative value of
the facts they exclude is undoubted. All the rules of privilege, for example, are
of that sort. The rules for the order of evidence assume the evidence to be rele-
vant. The rules for producing documentary originals concedes that a copy is
relevant, even though excluding the copy." 1 WIGM oRE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940)
§12.
The federal courts consider that a violation of the fifth amendment may auto-
matically occur if the fourth has been violated, so that evidence obtained by
unlawful searches and seizures is barred as being tantamount to self-incrimination.
However such evidence is not said to be irrelevant. In fact there is some agitation
to change this rule of the federal courts for the very reason that the evidence
barred by it may often manifestly be the most relevant and material evidence
in an entire case. ROrrSCHAEFER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 748.
' Evidence of a private and secretive nature may be barred because the court
feels that its utility to a court proceeding may not be commensurate to the detri-
ment that would be catsed the witness. Goss Printing Company v. Scott, 89 Fed.
818 (C. C. D. N. J. 1896). Some of the various types of private and secretive
evidence are illustrated in the trial of Aaron Burr, II Robertson's Rep. 517 (1807),
and Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105, 23 L. ed. 605 (1875) (state and mili-
tary secrets) ; State v. Beal, 199 N. C. 278, 154 S. E. 604 (1930) (religious and
theological beliefs); Boyer v. Teague, 106 N. C. 576, 625, 11 S. E. 665 (1890)
(a qualified voter does not have to reveal how he voted); Worrell v. Kinnear,
103 Va. 719, 49 S. E. 988 (1905) (trade, business, and manufacturing secrets);
R. v. Hunter, 3 C. & P. 591, 592 (1829) (land title-deeds in England).
Another common situation in which evidence may admittedly or manifestly be
relevant, yet still not be usable in a particular case is where such evidence would
be self-incriminatory. If the notion of the Harshaw case were applied to these
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present case represents an injustice to the defendants in that they were
not judged according to the accepted and proven law, and that the case
seems to confuse a law which previously had been well and wisely de-
termined.6 Heretofore the question of relevancy has been handled in
a logical, commonsense manner, without reference to the foreign and
unrelated topic of whether the statements were barred by estoppel. 7
The court quotes FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS8 to the effect that a final
judgment or decree affirming the existence of any fact is conclusive upon
the parties whenever that fact is again in issue between them. Granted
that an adjudicated fact is conclusive upon the parties, does it logically
follow that it is also irrelevant for them to bring such fact up for the
scrutiny of the court? It should be remembered that a matter which is
res judicata will be just as admissible in a trial as any other evidence,
unless the party against whom that fact is being used cares to call atten-
tion to and prove the fact that it is res judicata.9 It does not seem that
this quotation from Freeman's treatise justifies the court in imposing
upon litigants the burden of acting at their own risk when presenting
matter in their pleadings which may be defamatory.10 The effect of this
decision is to force a litigant to decide, even before he submits his
pleadings, the complicated question of law as to just what he is estopped
to plead," and the equally complicated question of what constitutes def-
amation, so that he can eliminate from his plea any defamation which
he is estopped to plead.
This same criticism might be made of the court's citing of Armfield
v. Moore,'2 Crawford v. Crawford,'3 and Gibbs v. Higgins.'4
In the Gibbs case, A et al. previously had sought partition of certain
lands, claiming to be the heirs of J. N. Higgins, the original owner,
deceased: B et al. were in possession of the land claiming under a deed
situations, the result would be holdings that whoever pleads libelous matter, which
can be proved only by self-incriminatory evidence or by evidence protected by
any other privilege, may be sued for libel. The same result would follow also in a
case where libelous pleadings could be proved only by testimony of the wife of
the one libeled, in view of the statutory provisions against such evidence. N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§1801-02.
' See note 5 supra.
'See note 5 supra; Shepard v. U. S., 290 U. S. 96, 54 S. Ct. 22, 78 L. ed.
196 (1934) ; Riss and Company v. Galloway, 108 Colo. -, 114 P. (2d) 550 (1941).
"2. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING RELEVANCY. .. . Lastly, the logical
powers employed must be those of everyday life, not those of the trained logician
or scientist. The conclusions and tests of everyday experience must constantly
control the standards of legal logic." 1 WIGMOsE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) §27.
s2 FREEMAN, JUDG-MENTS (5th ed. 1925) §670.
' Sanderson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 218 N. C. 270, 10 S. E. (2d) 802 (1940);
Williams v. Hutton, 164 N. C. 216, 80 S. E. 257 (1913).
"0 See note 5 supra.
"1 See notes 20, 21, 22 infra.
244 N. C. 157 (1852). 1214 N. C. 614, 200 S. E. 421 (1939).
11 215 N. C. 201, 1 S. E. (2d) 554 (1939).
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from said J. N. Higgins. A attacked this deed on grounds of lack of
mental capacity of the grantor. Decision was for B. In a later action,
A attacked the deed on grounds of undue influence. Held: A is estopped
to plead undue influence because the matter is res judicata. If this case
is given the interpretation which the present decision seeks to give it,
the effect is to say that anything which is res judicata may not be
pleaded at all, because it is irrelevant, such irrelevancy being a potential
basis of a subsequent libel suit. Such a notion obviously imposes a
phenomenal penalty upon litigants who may make an entirely innocent
mistake in pleading. In Current v. Webb,'5 a suit for damages incurred
in an automobile accident, question arose as to whether summons was
properly served on defendant, he being a nonresident. In the coroner's
inquest held previously it had been decided that defendant was exempt
from service. The matter was therefore held res judicata as to the
present action. Under the rule of the Harshaw case plaintiff would have
been subject to a libel action if he had inserted any libel in his pleadings,
even though he was not a privy of the parties of the first action, and
presumably did not know that the matter of defendant's exemption had
already been litigated.
In Ludwick v. Penny'6 question was raised as to whether res judi-
cata barred plaintiff from recovering damages for defendant's previous
maliciously brought dlaim-and-delivery suit against plaintiff, where
plaintiff had failed to raise this issue in a counterclaim in the original
suit. Since charging the defendant with malicious prosecution (and also
with destroying plaintiff's property) would be libelous, plaintiff would
have stood in great danger of a libel suit if the rule of the Harshaw case
had been in existence at that time.
In Bear v. Board of County Commissioners1 T plaintiff was barred
by res judicata even though he had not been a party to the original
action. Yet, if he had included something libelous in his pleadings he
would have been subject to a libel action, under the rule of the present
case. Clearly this would be an injustice to the pleader, since the prior
suit might not have come to his knowledge.
In Farrar v. Staton18 appellant was barred because he had waited
beyond the statutory limit to appeal. From the holding of the Harshaw
case, it would be logical to assume that appellant would be subject to
a libel action if he had included something libelous in his appeal.
It should be remembered that court proceedings are in the nature of
private warfare between the litigants; our system of trials is spoken of
10220 N. C. 423, 17 S. E. (2d) 641 (1941).
10158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E. (2d) 228 (1911).
17 122 N. C. 434, 29 S. E. 719 (1898).
18101 N. C. 78, 7 S. E. 743 (1888).
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as the adversary system.19 So it is obvious that many complaints and
answers will contain some libelous matter.
To see the effect of saying that anything in the pleadings which is
res judicata may afford a basis for a subsequent libel suit, it is necessary
to examine the central ideas of the doctrine of res judicata: 1) An
entire cause of action is res judicata when a final judgment on its merits
has occurred. The losing plaintiff cannot win in a subsequent suit on
that cause of action even though he bases this later suit on allegations
not pleaded at all in the first action, if they could have been pleaded.
Plaintiff will lose in the second suit even though favored by all law and
equity if the defendant proves that the matter is res jludicata.20 2) Also,
each individual allegation tried in any action will be deemed res judicata
upon any future occasion when the same parties or their privies again
oppose each other in court even though the cause of action is entirely
different from that of the suit in which the fact was originally adjudi-
cated. 21 These rules appear simple, but in truth the law of res judicata
" Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 55 L. ed. 246, 31 S. Ct. 250 (1911) ;
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803) ; see In Re Pacific R.
Commission, 32 Fed. 241, 255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1887).2 Crowley v. Mellon, 52 Ark. 1, 11 S. W. 876 (1889) (a judgment which
even erroneously awards Idower'to a widow nonetheless renders res judicata the
fact of her right to it) ; Buttnick v. Buttnick, 121 Wash. 211, 209 Pac. 6 (1922)
(and cases cited); Moore v. Harkins, 179 N. C. 167, 101 S. E. 564 (1919);
Northcott v. Northcott, 175 N. C. 148, 95 S. E. 104 (1918) ; Cropsey v. Markham,
171 N. C. 43, 87 S. E. 950 (1916).
2 In Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho 150, 96 Pac. 579 (1908), facts were that
plaintiff and deceased had previously received a Mormon Church divorce, but in
litigation on the matter the divorce was held null and void, and judgment was
that plaintiff and deceased remained man and wife. Plaintiff is now seeking her
statutory allowance of half her husband's property. Defendants plead that she
was not his wife. In holding that this defense was barred the court said, "To
make the matter res adjudicata it is immaterial that the question alleged to have
been settled by a former adjudication was determined in a different kind of
proceeding or a different form of action from that in which the estoppel is
claimed. The test is: Was the question actually and directly in issue and judicially
determined in the former suit between the same parties or their privies in a
court of competent jurisdiction?" (In a later case, Hilton v. Snyder, 37 Utah
384, 108 Pac. 698 (1910), the fact of Mrs. Hilton's marriage was not held res
judicata, the parties to that suit not being privies of the parties in the original
action).
Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 41, 25 N. E. 292 (1890); Current v. Webb,
220 N. C. 423, 17 S. E. (2d) 614 (1941).
A case contra the above and the Harshaw case is Bordwell v. Snow, 119
Mich. 421, 78 N. W. 468 (1899), which is the only case in the United States
with substantially the same fact situation as the Harshaw case. A had sought
the weekly allowance, awarded by statute to widows, and had been adjudged to
be the widow of the deceased, though the heirs had pleaded otherwise. In holding
that this adjudication was not conclusive (a fortiori, not irrelevant) in a subse-
quent action by A for a distributive share of the estate, the court said, "His
[the trial judge's] determination that relator is the widow of Mr. Bordwell is
conclusive only so far as it relates to the allowances made . . . and is not res
iudicata as to her right as widow to the distributive share of the estate to which
the widow is entitled."
Despite the Bordwell case, it is no doubt in accord with the well-settled law
that the fact of Mrs. Harshaw's marriage was res judicata (though not irrele-
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is in a state of confusion and flux, as a glance at any recent digest will
indicate. Essentially the question of res judicata is a problem in decid-
ing whether to let the public policies of protecting rights already estab-
lished by court decree and of preventing redundant litigation bar the
court from looking into the real equities of the case.2 2 Thus the appli-
cation of the res judicata rules is one of the most uncertain things in
all law. To suppose that the parties themselves can properly decide the
question before submitting their pleadings is to indulge in the fantasy
that the average practicing lawyer is a perfect jurist.
If the clear inference of the present case-that a cause of action for
libel accrues where a libelous pleading is res judicata-is carried to its
logical conclusion, it would seem that the defendants in the present case
could not have pleaded truth as a defense to the charge of libel. For to
plead still a third time that the plaintiff was not married would give the
plaintiff still another cause of action for libel.2 It would seem that we
are to believe that pleading truth as a defense to libel involves the risk
of such plea itself being actionable libel. Such a theory is especially
harsh when it is remembered that the defendants in the present case may
still in good faith believe that the plaintiff was not married, and that
she has committed perjury24 so that the prior adjudications were mis-
carriages of justice.
It is submitted that the plaintiff in the present case would not have
vant) in the second (dower) action. But considering the purposes and social needs
from which the doctrine of res judicata sprang, is it entirely logical to consider
this fact res judicata? "The doctrine is an outgrowth of the familiar maxim that
a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause, and the other wholesome rule
of the law that it is in the interest of the State that there be an end of litigation,
and consequently a matter of public concern that solemn adjudications of the
courts should not be disturbed." White v. Tayloe, 153 N. C. 29, 68 S. E. 907
(1910). Obviously, the first purpose mentioned, that of making litigants secure
in their adjudicated rights, is not served by holding the fact of Mrs. Harshaw's
marriage res judicata, as the defendants were merely using that plea as a defense,
not as a means of rendering insecure her previously obtained rights. Nor is the
second purpose, that of preventing multiplicity of suits, served by holding that
fact res judicata. For the suits had already multiplied, as it were, before the
defendants made this plea.
Compare American Woollen Company v. Lesher, 267 Ill. 11, 107 N. E. 882
(1915), with Buttnick v. Buttnick, 121 Wash. 211, 209 Pac. 6 (1922).
"Note (1941) 55 HARv. L. Rav. 120.
"' The doctrine of res judicata applies to defenses, either litigated or which
might have been litigated, just as forcefully as it does to claims and counterclaims.
Lee v. McKoy, 118 N. C. 518, 24 S. E. 210 (1895) ; Bond v. Billups, 53 N. C. 423
(1861). Clearly then, each subsequent defense that Mrs. Harshaw was not legally
married would be -res judicata, and actionable libel under the rule of the Harshaw
case. For each repetition of a libelous statement gives a separate cause of action.
Cook v. Connors, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78 (1915) ; Underwood v. Smith, 93
Tenn. 687, 27 S. W. 1008 (1894).
24 A cause of action is res judicata despite the fact that fraud or false testimony
was involved in the litigation. Peninsula Iron Company v. Eels, 68 Fed. 24 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1895); Guling v. Washoe County Bank, 24 Nev. 477, 56 Pac. 580
(1899).
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been left in any great difficulty if the decision had gone against her.
Her virtue had already been established once by court decree. In any
event, it would seem to be more in accord with public policy to permit
complete freedom and complete latitude of choice of allegations in plead-
ings than to protect individuals against this one possible source of
defamation,25 even though the defamation may be malicious.2 6
MILTON SHORT.
" For a general discussion of the social policies and purposes behind the doc-
trine of privilege, see HARPER, TORTS (1933) §9.
2Certain communications are absolutely privileged, while others are only
qualifiedly privileged. The presence of malice is immaterial in those cases where
the communication is absolutely privileged. Communications in court pleadings
are absolutely privileged. Nicholson v. Dillard, 137 Ga. 225, 73 S. E. 382 (1911) ;
Wilson v. Sullivan, 81 Ga. 238, 7 S. E. 274 (1888) ; Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C.
187, 104 S. E. 360 (1920) ; Pennick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S. E. 664 (1927);
HARPER, TORTS (1933) §247, at page 528; Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 242.
